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I. GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 
JOINT APPLIED PROJECT PLAN 
A. TENTATIVE PROJECT TITLE  
The Department of Defenses transition of Program of Record (POR) systems 
from Internet Protocol Version Four (IPv4) to Internet Protocol Version Six (IPv6).    
B. PROJECT PLAN ABSTRACT  
The objective of this project is to examine the technical, financial, and 
implementation aspects for the DoD transitioning POR systems to IPv6.  The technical 
aspects will be examined to establish a basis for the transition.  The discussion will 
outline the initial intended useful life and its limitations.  The financial aspects of 
transitioning will be discussed from a program’s perspective relative to the Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM).  Implementation of the transition will be discussed to 
identify the courses of action for implementing the mandatory IPv6 requirement.  As a 
result of this project, officials in the Army will better understand whether or not the 
mandatory transition makes good business sense and is executable.   
C. PROJECT SPONSOR  
N/A 
D. PROJECT TEAM MEMBERS  
Name    Curric    Grad Date     Service            Signature         Date 
 
Kyle Perkins     836       12/06       Army   
Michael A. Scott   836       12/06       Army 
 
E. ADVISOR 
Name                     Advisor Role/Org.               Approved         Date 
 
Raymond E. Franck P.H.D   Lead Advisor/NPS 
 
F. ACADEMIC ASSOCIATE  
Name           Curriculum                            Reviewed         Date 
  
Brad R. Naegle    836 
 
Submit completed Project Plan to the BPP Office of Instruction (IN306).  Date________ 
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G. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
1.   Project Title   
The Department of Defenses transition of Program of Record (POR) systems 
from Internet Protocol Version Four (IPv4) to Internet Protocol Version Six (IPv6).    
2.   Project Topic   
Analyze and compare IPv4 and IPv6, while outlining the business case for 
implementation.    
3.   Project Objectives   
To determine the need and direction for IPv6, based upon answers to the 
following four questions:  
Q1:  How should address space be allocated? 
Q2:  How does the DoD’s financial system bound the implementation? 
Q3:  What are the benefits’s for the DoD to transition to IPv6?  
Q4:  What are the issues surrounding the transition to IPv6? 
Q5:  What are the transition mechanisms and strategies regarding IPv6?  
4.   Background   
The DoD has established the goal of transitioning all DoD networking to the next 
generation of the Internet Protocol, IPv6, by Fiscal year (FY) 2008.  A key tenet of the 
DoD transition strategy is to minimize later transition costs by ensuring that the products 
and systems that are procured, acquired or in development after 1 October 2003 are 
capable of operating in IPv6 networks, as well as maintaining a capability to operate in 
today’s IPv4 world.  Given DoD’s generally long technology refreshment cycle and 
lengthy development timelines this direction is intended to posture DoD to complete a 
transition to IPv6 by 2008 with minimal additional cost and impact to current capabilities.   
H. ACTIVITIES  
1.   Problem Identification 
The IPv4 to IPv6 transition will be a significant challenge for the Army. A large 
number of hardware and software systems including applications will need to be 
upgraded or replaced, in some cases under an accelerated technology refresh rate. During 
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the transition phase, new or modified IPv6 capable systems and applications will need to 
operate with the existing IPv4 systems and applications without degradation in 
performance, reduction in availability, or compromise of security.  Application migration 
to IPv6 is a complex and difficult area of transition. Business and institutional system 
migrations are dependent on commercial vendors support.  We must get industry partners 
(not just defense contractors) working to help meet the Army’s goals. 
2.   Appropriate Data 
Data will be collected from Army Program Management Offices (PMOs) which 
manage the weapons systems and various other DoD organizations that have a significant 
interest in the transition.  
3.   Appropriate Analysis   
Reports and information will be analyzed to determine feasibility, if any, based 
upon the finalized project objectives list.  
I. EXPECTED ACCOMPLISHMENTS  
1.   Product   
Joint Applied Project Report. 
2.   Report Content   
An analysis sufficient to determine whether or not the DoD’s strategy for 
implementing IPv6 across DoD networks is viable.  Evidence sufficient to determine 
whether or not the DoD’s mandates are being implemented effectively to affected 
programs.   
J. ROLES OF PROJECT PARTICIPANTS  
1.   Role of Team Members 
There are both collective and individual roles for team members.  Collectively, 
the members will develop the final project schedule and plan of activities (including 
assignment of individuals to activities), further develop the research methodologies, peer 
review the data and analysis, review and comment on the final report draft to form a 
consensus version.  Individually, team members will perform research/gather data in 
independent areas in parallel (to speed data gathering efforts), perform data analysis in 
parallel using common agreed-upon methods, and develop drafts of specific sections of 
the final report.  One team member will be designated as the final version editor/tech 
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writer.  Research tasks will be split based on individual expertise, organizational element, 
and interest.  Team members are also expected to participate in regular group meetings to 
assess progress, discuss and/or correspond with the advisors telephonically or through 
email on a regular basis, and to perform all tasks IAW the agreed-to schedule.  Since the 
team members are not collocated together the use of email and telephone is expected to 
be the norm.  
2.   Role of Advisors  
The project advisors are expected to provide guidance to the team on: 
• Scope and expected timeframe of efforts to enable completion. 
• Data sources and gathering methods, including identifying pertinent POCs 
and known related studies. 
• Report writing/style and content. 
The advisors are also expected to be available for periodic planned telephonic 
discussions of project status, and be available to answer email and impromptu telephone 
questions in a mutually-agreed-to timeframe. 
K. SPONSORS/CLIENTS   
None. 
L. OTHER   
None 
M. SCHEDULE 
(all dates CY06 unless otherwise noted) 
 
Jun-Jul  Initial project plan, secure advisors.  [Completed] 
Aug-Sep  Finalize project plan – gain approval of advisors and associate.   
Develop detailed schedule, assign individual tasks (research, analysis). 
Sep Begin individual research tasks, including info gathering DoD programs 
affected by IPv6 transition. 
Oct Complete individual research tasks.  Begin data analysis.  Begin writing 
report (background, approach, etc.).  
Nov Complete data analysis. Develop conclusions 
Nov-Dec  Submit “chapters” to advisors as available for review. 
Early Dec First draft of full report, submit to Advisors for comments/revisions. 
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Mid Dec Receive comments/revisions, incorporate, finalize report. 
Mid Dec Advisor(s) approval of report.  Begin submittal process for NPS approval. 
Jan/Feb 07 Report published by NPS. 
N. RESOURCES   
No additional resources or funding anticipated. 
O. REFERENCES 
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II.   IPV6 BACKGROUND  
A., IPV6 INTRODUCTION 
The internet currently operates under IPv4 which was developed in the 1970’s. 
IPv6 was designed to support continued Internet growth in number of users and 
functionality and is the next generation of Internet protocol. The growth of the Internet is 
currently constrained due to the limitations that IPv4 suffers from. IPv4 allows for only 
232 (4,294,967,296) addresses which seems like a very large number, but in fact is much 
too small for today and tomorrow’s Internet.  
The population of the Earth has grown to approximately 6.6 billion people and 
with IPv4 there is not enough address space available to give one IP address to every 
person on the Earth.  IPv6 has been under development for over ten years and has been 
designed to overcome these limitations by greatly expanding available IP address space, 
and by incorporating other features such as mobile communications, Quality of Service 
(QoS), end-to-end security, and system management burden reduction.  The rapid growth 
of the Internet as a fundamental technology for commercial, social activity, and military 
information transfer has been staggering.  The Internet has grown rapidly in the past five 
years to a level well beyond that which the original Internet designers envisioned over 
twenty years ago.  
Global IP address space is now at a premium and applications are forced to work 
with mechanisms that provide local addressing.  Without sufficient IP addresses 
numerous workarounds such as Network Address Translation (NAT) and extensions to 
IPv4 have been implemented to try to overcome its limitations.  These workarounds 
allow multiple devices to use local private addresses within an enterprise while sharing 
one or more global IPv4 addresses for external communications.  While NAT has delayed 
the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses it also complicates the application of general bi-
directional communication.  IPv6 removes the need for the use of NAT since global 
addresses will be widely available.  
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The transition of the global Internet from IPv4 to IPv6 is expected to span many 
years.  During this period, many organizations will introduce IPv6 into their 
infrastructure and will operate in a dual stack environment supporting IPv4 and IPv6 
concurrently.  The incremental approach allows for a period where IPv4 and IPv6 can co-
exist using one or more transition mechanisms to ensure interoperability between the old 
and new protocols. The transition to IPv6 is expected to be complicated and the transition 
strategies for IPv6 will be dependent on the networks and systems targeted for transition.   
B.   IPV6 FEATURES AND BENEFITS 
The design and evolution of the IPv6 protocol represents the work of many  
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and working group proposals over several years. 
The core of IPv6 was built on the existing features of IPv4 and designed to provide new 
services and capabilities. The driving requirement for IPv6 was to extend the IP address 
space enough to offer a unique IP address to any device.  IPv6 was also designed to 
enable stateless IP auto-configuration and improved “plug and play” support, provide 
support for network address renumbering, enable mandatory implementation of IP 
Security (IPsec) support for all fully IPv6-compliant, and improve support for IP 
Mobility. 
The following is a list of the features and benefits IPv6 is intended to provide: 
• Larger address space – IPv6 increases the IP address size from 32 bits to 
128 bits.  Increasing the size of the address field increases number of 
unique IP addresses from approximately 4,300,000,000 (4.3×109) to 
340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 (3.4×1038).   
• End-to-end transparency – The increased number of available addresses 
reduces the need to use address translation technologies.  
• Hierarchical addressing – The hierarchical addressing scheme provides 
for address summarization and aggregation.  These approaches simplify 
routing and manage routing table growth.  
• Enhanced applications functionality – Simplifies direct peer-to-peer 
applications and networking by providing a unique address to each device. 
• Scalability of multicast routing – IPv6 provides a much larger pool of 
multicast addresses with multiple scoping options 
• Auto-configuration – Clients using IPv4 addresses use the Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server to establish an address each time 
they log into a network. This address assignment process is called stateful 
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auto-configuration.  IPv6 supports a revised DHCPv6 protocol that 
supports stateful auto-configuration, and supports stateless auto-
configuration of nodes.  Stateless auto-configuration does not require a 
DHCP server to obtain addresses.  Stateless auto-configuration uses router 
advertisements to create a unique address. This creates a “plug-and-play” 
environment, simplifying address management and administration.  IPv6 
also allows automatic address configuration and reconfiguration.  This 
capability allows administrators to re-number network addresses without 
accessing all clients.  
C. DOD IPV6 TRANSITION 
The Department of Defense has established a goal that all Global Information 
Grid (GIG) Information Technology (IT) assets are to transition from the current Internet 
Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) to the newly developing Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) by 
FY08 in order to avoid technical obsolescence within the next 10 to 20 years. Although 
the transition to IPv6 is currently progressing rapidly in Asia and Europe, its acceptance 
in North America has been minimal. Nonetheless, the eventual ubiquitous 
implementation of IPv6 seems to be inevitable, and the long development cycle of 
technology in the defense industry has prompted the DoD to become an early advocate of 
implementing IPv6. 
In response to the DoD goal and subsequent guidance, the Army has established a 
transition plan to facilitate a well-coordinated effort to phase-out IPv4 and replace it with 
IPv6. The task is very extensive and complex because it impacts tens of thousands of 
computing and communications devices, and software applications. 
The Army plan provides a governance structure that will be headed by the Chief 
Information Officer, (CIO/G-6). A working group and a task force have been formed to 
assist the CIO/G-6 in planning and managing this mission. The plan also provides 
detailed guidance to the organizations that will be implementing IPv6 in their products 
and systems. The IPv6 implementers include the twelve Program Executive Offices 
(PEOs), the Installation Management Activity (IMA), the Major Commands (MACOMs), 
the Army Reserve, and the National Guard Bureau. 
It is expected the full transition to IPv6 will take many years, and during the 
interim the two IP protocols will co-exist. The transition is also expected to be quite 
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costly. Senior leaders in the DoD hope additional costs can be controlled by 
implementing IPv6 through the normal technical refresh cycle of a program or through 
pre-planned product improvements (P3I). However, costs will be incurred to mitigate risk 
through the establishment of pilot programs and testing. A waiver process is available for 
cases in which systems may not be able to transition in a timely manner, or where 
systems may never be able to transition due to severe technical, logistical, or financial 
restrictions.  
To maintain secure operations, it is clearly stated in the DoD and Army transition 
plans that IPv6 is not be used on any operational network, or any DoD network carrying 
sensitive information, until it is completely compliant with all National Security Agency 
(NSA) requirements. (Department of the Army Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) 
Transition Plan (Phase 1) Version 0.9, 11 March 2004) 
1. Army IPv6 Transition 
On 9 June 2003, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration (ASD NII) issued a policy memorandum regarding the Enterprise-wide 
deployment of IPv6. The policy establishes the goal of transitioning all DoD enterprise-
wide networks from IPv4 to IPv6 by Fiscal Year (FY) 2008. The policy pertains to all IT 
and National Security Systems (NSS) which make up the GIG. Key points of this policy 
include the following: 
• As of October 1, 2003, all GIG assets being developed, procured, or 
acquired shall be IPv6 capable, in addition to maintaining interoperability 
with IPv4 systems and services. 
• Specific near-term IPv6 implementation pilots, demonstrations, and test 
beds will be identified by the DoD Chief Information Office (CIO) as part 
of the transition planning process. 
• No implementations of IPv6 shall be permitted on the networks carrying 
operations traffic within the DoD until authorized by the DoD. This is to 
assure that all information assurance concerns have been properly 
addressed prior to implementing IPv6. 
• The DoD CIO will lead, in consult with the Joint Staff and with the 
participation of the DoD Components and Services, the development of an 
IPv6 transition plan. 
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On 29 September 2003, the ASD NII issued a related memorandum to provide 
interim guidance to support the requirement to begin to procure and acquire IPv6-capable 
GIG assets on 1 October 2003. The memorandum defines the meaning of IPv6 capable, 
announces a Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) standards profile for IPv6, and describes 
a waiver process. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
In response to the DoD memorandums, the Army CIO, LTG Boutelle, issued a 
memorandum on 5 November 2003, endorsing the Army’s position to support the 
transition to IPv6. (Department of the Army Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Transition 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
13 
III.   DOD TRANSITION OF PROGRAM OF RECORD (POR) 
SYSTEMS FROM IPV4 TO IPV6 
A. HOW TO ALLOCATE ADDRESS SPACE?  WHAT IS AN INTERNET 
PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESS? 
As the Department of Defense (DoD) moves further into the digital arena of 
warfare, the demand for Internet Protocol (IP) address space is increasing dramatically.  
The future theater of operations will require manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air 
vehicles, sensors and munitions to have networked suites of weapons interoperating 
seamlessly with other military networks.  In order for these devices to receive 
information and communicate, they will require IP addresses.  An IP address identifies 
and allows these devices to communicate with each other.  This means all devices from 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to Command and Control Suites that require a 
connection to the internet will also need an IP address.  This can be thought of as a street 
address or phone number because an IP address identifies a specific computer or 
computer device that is connecting to the internet.   
B. CURRENT WORLDWIDE SPACE ALLOCATION 
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is the global body that 
allocates super-blocks of address space to Regional Internet Registries (RIR), who then 
allocate smaller blocks to Internet Service Providers (ISP) and enterprises.  An ISP such 
as America Online (AOL) will then charge a fee for using one of their IP addresses to 
connection to the internet.  ISPs obtain allocations of IP addresses from a local Internet 
registry (LIR) or national Internet registry (NIR), or from their appropriate Regional 
Internet Registry (RIR): 
• AfriNIC (African Network Information Centre) - Africa Region 
• APNIC (Asia Pacific Network Information Centre) - Asia/Pacific Region 
• ARIN (American Registry for Internet Numbers) - North America Region 
• LACNIC (Regional Latin-American and Caribbean IP Address Registry) – 
Latin America and some Caribbean Islands 




C. ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES  
The IANA will allocate sufficient IPv6 address space to the RIRs to support their 
registration needs for at least an 18 month period.  The IANA will also allow the RIRs to 
apply their own chosen allocation and reservation strategies in order to ensure the 
efficiency of their work.  The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) is responsible for the global coordination of the Internet’s system of unique 
identifiers.  Unique identifies include domain names like .org or .museum, and country 
codes such as .UK .IE.  Any new RIR shall, on recognition by ICANN receive an IPv6 
allocation from the IANA.  A RIR is eligible to receive additional IPv6 address space 
from the IANA when either of the following conditions is met: the RIR's available space 
of IPv6 addresses is less than 50% of the minimum number of allocated address spaces or 
the RIR's available space of IPv6 addresses is less than its established necessary space for 
the following 9 months.  In either case, IANA shall make a single IPv6 allocation, 
sufficient to satisfy the established necessary space of the RIR for an 18 month period.  
If the applying RIR anticipates that more address spaces will be required within a 
six month period actual space allocated will be determined by calculating total needs 
according to a projection and special facts that justify these needs.  When additional 
necessary space is required, RIR’s are required to submit a clear and detailed justification 
with the above mentioned projection.  If the justification is based on the allocation 
tendency prepared by the RIR’s data, explaining said tendency must be enclosed.  If the 
justification is based on external factors such as a new infrastructure, new services within 
the region, technological advances or legal issues, the corresponding analysis must be 
enclosed together with references to information sources that will allow verification of 
the data.  If IANA does not have elements that clearly question the RIR's projection, the 
special needs projected for the following 18 months, indicated above, shall be considered 
valid.  The IANA, the NRO, and the RIRs will make announcements and update their 
respective web sites regarding an allocation made by the IANA to an RIR. ICANN and 
the Number Resource Organization (NRO) will establish administrative procedures to 
manage this process.  
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D. ADDRESSING PLAN FOR THE DOD 
Addressing plans are constrained by The Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Network and Information Infrastructure (OSD NII), which has directed the DoD to 
incorporate IPv6 and operate in a dual IP (IPv4 and IPv6) capacity for the foreseeable 
future. OSD NII further directed that IPv6 be deployed principally utilizing existing 
technical refresh funding. The current communication model of the DoD is similar to that 
of a corporate holding company and not a single enterprise. Relationships exist between 
IP (IPv4 and IPv6) address block allocation, the Domain Name System (DNS) system, 
routing, and certain Information Assurance (IA) capabilities that are mission essential to 
the DoD.  Relationships exist between IP (IPv4 and IPv6) address block allocation, the 
Domain Name System (DNS) system, routing, and certain Information Assurance (IA) 
capabilities that are mission essential to the DoD.   
ARIN has allocated four IPv6 address prefixes for the DoD’s use. The DoD IPv6 
Transition Office (DITO), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the 
representative Services (Army, Navy and the Air Force) have consensus on the initial 
high-level IPv6 address allocation process Addressing Plan.  The DoD is planning for the 
reassignment of these address blocks among the Services, Agencies, and other DoD 
organizations.  The Military Network Information Center (MIL NIC) will reassign the 
GIG CT Core IPv6 address blocks between, unclassified, secret, and the top secret 
address block to the USN NIC for its address reassignment function. The GIG is a 
globally-connected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and 
personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on 
demand.  The MIL NIC will reassign the GIG CT Core IPv6 address block, the 
unclassified IPv6 address block, secret IPv6 address block, and the top secret IPv6 
address block to the MIL NIC for its address reassignment function. The MIL NIC will 
reassign the GIG CT Core IPv6 address block, the unclassified IPv6 address block, secret 
IPv6 address block, and the top secret IPv6 address block to the AF NIC for its address 
reassignment function. The MIL NIC will reassign the GIG CT Core IPv6 address block, 
the unclassified IPv6 address block, secret IPv6 address block, and the top secret IPv6 
address block to the ARMY NIC for its address reassignment function. The MIL NIC 
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will retain the remaining IPv6 address space for its own address reassignment function to 
joint programs and for future use by the service NICs. 
E. NETWORKS 
DoD’s Unclassified and Classified traffic are transported over completely 
segregated networks, such that each level of classification has its own separate 
infrastructure, network services, and administration. IPv6 addressing plans are expected 
to support this architectural choice in the short term, and as long as such networks 
segregated by classification levels exist.  DoD programs will only connect to peers with 
IPv6 address space of the same classification. Unclassified, Allied and Coalition 
programs may connect with non-DoD entities through approved IA access points. Allied 
and Coalition networks will be appropriately segregated from operational DoD networks 
of similar classification.  
After 2008 the DoD will introduce the Global Information Grid (GIG), also 
known as the Black Core or Cipher Text (CT) Core architecture. The GIG CT will have 
dedicated infrastructure, network services, and administration. In the CT Core 
architecture, all Plain Text (PT) traffic will be encrypted using High Assurance Internet 
Protocol (HAIPE) Devices, and the encrypted packet will be appended with the IPv6 
address of the destination HAIPE Device. The destination HAIPE Device, once having 
received the encrypted packet, decrypts it, and then forwards it to the destination host.  
F. DOD NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER IPV6 ADDRESS 
MANAGEMENT  
The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains the MIL NIC, Service NICs, and 
Agency NICs organized in a hierarchical structure.  These are collectively termed “DoD 
NICs”. DoD NICs will function similarly with IPv6 since they do with IPv4. The MIL 
NIC, as part of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), will manage the 
ongoing acquisition of IPv6 address space for the entire Department of Defense (DoD) 
and its reassignment within the DoD enterprise.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the DoD NICs, RIRs, and IANA. 
The MIL NIC shall manage the reassignment of IPv6 address blocks to Service NICs, 
Agency NICs, and directly to appropriate joint programs based upon demonstrated need. 
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Service and Agency NICs will acquire IPv6 address blocks solely from the MIL NIC and 
will reassign IPv6 address blocks only to their respective Service and Agency programs 
according to demonstrated need.  
DoD NICs will continue to maintain Domain Name Servers (DNS), zone files, 
and delegate subordinate zones for their respective forward DNS zones.  The DNSs 
translates web addresses such as “http://www.nps.navy.mil” into an IP address so the 
computer can communicate on the network.  Zone files store and categorize the DNS 
information.  For example, the MIL NIC will continue to maintain DNS servers for the 
MIL forward DNS zone and delegate subzones of .mil to the DoD Services and Agencies. 
In another example, the Navy NIC will continue to maintain DNS servers for the 
NAVY.MIL forward DNS zone.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Relationships between the DoD NICs, RIRs and IANA (From: Brig, P. 






NICS (if any) 
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One or more contiguous and or noncontiguous IPv6 address space 
blocks that has been reassigned. Reassignment can be from a 
registry to a subordinate registry or from a registry to a tier one 
ISP, enterprise, or program.
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G. DOD COST TO TRANSITION POR SYSTEMS FROM IPV4 TO IPV6 
The Department of Defense has established a goal that all GIG IT assets are to 
transition from the current IPv4 to the newly developing IPv6 by FY08 in order to avoid 
technical obsolescence within the next 10 to 20 years.  In order to meet this date the DoD 
issued a mandate dated 9 Jun 2003.  Although the transition to IPv6 is currently 
progressing rapidly in Asia and Europe, its acceptance in North America has been 
minimal. Nonetheless, full implementation of IPv6 seems to be inevitable, and the long 
development cycle of technology in the defense industry has prompted the DoD to 
become an early advocate of implementing IPv6.  (DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6 (IPv6) TRANSITION PLAN (Phase 1) Version 
0.9 dated 11 March 2004) 
H. OVERALL DOD ESTIMATE TO MEET MANDATE 
The DoD has estimated that in order to meet the FY08 mandate $2.3B additional 
funding would be required (Director, Technical Architecture Division Architecture 
Operations Network & Space CIO/G-6).  This estimate was based on the assumption that 
all GIG IT assets will be transitioned regardless of where these assets are in their 
lifecycle (i.e. Development, Deployed, within 5 years of obsolescence).  The current DoD 
transition estimate makes some overriding assumptions and  extends the transition period 
until FY16, which reduces the transition cost by approximately 50% or $1.6B (Director, 
Technical Architecture Division Architecture Operations Network & Space CIO/G-6).  
The assumption was made to reduce the cost to DoD center on the basic principle that the 
transition will be implemented with Technology Refresh whenever feasible.  The 
majority of the cost estimate includes: 
• Experimentation, Testing, Modeling & Simulation 
• Transition Mechanisms 
• Pilots 
• Certifications 
• Programs without Tech Refresh or P3I 




The current estimate for transition costs centers on Technology Refresh while half 
the cost of the original estimate still represents a substantial investment for DoD and 
funding must be identified in the POM in order to implement the transition. The current 
POM funding identifies approximately $600M to implement the transition.  While this 
funding is roughly half the current DoD estimate the funding is based on the assumption 
that the transition will align with current technology upgrade programs as the following:  
• GIG Bandwidth Expansion 
• Task Force Modularity 
• LandWarNet Architecture 
• Deployment of Enterprise-level Transition Mechanisms 
• Fielding of JTRS and WIN-T 
I. ARMY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICES (PEO) ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
TRANSITION COST ESTIMATES  
The Army’s nine PEOs have established an IPv6 Transition Plan Working Group 
to evaluate progress made on implementing the IPv6 Transition Plan.  The working group 
allows PEOs to share information among members and provide additional guidance 
relevant to the transition.   
CIO/G6 provided PEOs costing templates that provide a comprehensive set of 
issues to consider when developing transition cost estimates.  While working the 
requirement many of the PEOs have experienced difficulty gathering the required 
information from PMs.  PEOs are continually working with PMs to gain consistency on 
the reports in order for the requirements to be validated.  Most of the problems PMs are 
having while attempting to gather the required information is the significant number of 
unknowns.  PMs continually receive mixed guidance on IPv6 transition because most are 
slated for termination or replacement with the FCS. 
PEO Command Control Communication Tactical (PEO C3T), headquartered at 
Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey expressed several concerns relative to the transition.  First, 
systems deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are granted blanket 
waivers that withdraw the requirement to transition system by FY08. This waiver will 
cover systems procured for immediate mission support and enhance the ability to support 
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the soldier in a timely manner.  Another issue of concern is modularity is not being 
implemented with a normal Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.  Modularity 
changes the scope of the network infrastructure and PEO C3T has not been provided 
POM information which would allow them to identify technology refreshments.  This 
information is based on the fact that the Army will not fund Common User System 
modifications after FY06.  This significantly affects the ability for PEO C3T to fund the 
transition.              
J. PM ASSUMPTIONS FOR TRANSITION COST ESTIMATES  
• The DoD mandate applies to IP based systems and networks, only if a 
system/network is part/component of, or draw service from the GIG that 
systems must transition. 
• If a system/network is not a part/component of, nor derives services from 
the GIG, system will not be required to transition to IPv6, however it, 
must transition to IPv6 when requirements change. 
• Contractor-Government interface must be IPv6 capable. 
• OSD is responsible for transition of joint programs.  
• The SINCGARS/EPLRS network will not transition to IPv6.  It will be 
replaced by IPv6-capable WIN-T and JTRS starting in about 2009.  
Waivers will be granted in the interim period.  
• DoD will establish the minimum testing standards for IPv6 compliance. 
• IPv6 capable COTS products will be available via acquisition or upgrade 
of new software.  This includes networking products (routers, firewalls, 
net management tools, etc.), network services (directory services, DNS, 
etc.).  Networked applications (email servers, C4 systems, databases, 
medical systems, etc.). 
• Testing and certification (including security certification, accreditation, 
and safety critical testing) of systems not yet at Milestone C should not be 
included as part of the IPv6 transition. 
• Systems within five years of obsolescence (from FY04) will not be 
required to transition to IPv6.  The replacement system must be identified. 
• Organizational Intranets will be transitioned by the owner using his own 
programmed resources and timeframes. 
• IPv4 and IPv6 will coexist past the current POM (beyond FY11). 
• Costs will be incurred to integrate multi-vendor (COTS) IPv6 capable 
products. 
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• If feasible to make GOTS products IPv6 capable, then costs will be 
incurred, otherwise, co-existence mechanisms will be used as interim 
solution until replacement. 
• Expenses to upgrade HAIPE, INE, HAG will be borne by DoD. 
• Additional costs may be incurred to mitigate IPv6 performance issues.  
• Waivers will be granted for all systems developed in Software Blocks 
prior to the implementation. Rationale for this waiver is that supporting 
interoperability systems and radios will not be available until at least 
Block 4, 5, or 6. (Implementers IPv6 Transition Plan for PEO Ground 
Combat Systems) 
K. BENEFIT TO THE DOD OF TRANSITION 
1.   Interoperability  
Traditionally the DoD has administered data interoperability programs.  Data 
administration attempted to standardize and control data elements, definitions, and 
structures across the DoD enterprise of databases and networks.  This approach requires 
consensus among and across organizations, standardization of data elements, minimized 
duplication of data elements, and reduced need for data element translation.  This 
approach has since been abandoned due to the vast scope of the DoD.  
The Net-centric vision for the future of the DoD’s fighting force depends 
significantly on the GIG providing interoperability of inter-networked sensors, platforms, 
facilities, people and information.  This vision will connect everyone from the 
commander to the warfighter in the field and is founded on the principles of the GIG’s 
transport layer.  Increased interoperability will allow soldiers to leverage the same data, 
rather than relying on traditional point-to-point interfaces.  Having soldiers connected 
across the spectrum of operation will accelerate decision cycles by having the data 
visible, available and usable when and where it is needed.  The increase in speed in 
accessing data will further enhance the commander’s decision making in situations where 
time is of the essence.  Data will be available so users can receive information in a timely 
manner without waiting for processing, exploitation, and dissemination.  With data posed 
to shared spaces the user can determine the utility of information rather than waiting for 
the originator to process.       
22 
The Net-centric Data Strategy seeks to expand the focus of visibility and 
accessibility of data rather than just standardization.   The strategy recognizes the need 
for data to be available for unanticipated users as well as the originally intended users.  
The overall objective is to increase the ability of the system to leverage the same data 
without the ability to access the information to be designed in.  The Net-centric strategy 
will realize the availability of system files, databases, documents, official electronic 
records, images, audio files, web sites, and data access service.   This significantly moves 
the culture away from processing, exploiting, and disseminating to a post before process 
mentality.   
2.   Improved End-to-End Security  
The security of DoD networks is essential to successfully implementing IPv6.  
Several steps must be taken to ensure that classified information is not compromised 
during the transition.  While the commercial world and DoD evolve to IPv6 DoD will 
continue to leverage work in this area and take advantage of products that emerge.   
The security issues surrounding transitioning to IPv6 start with the transition 
mechanisms themselves because IPv6 products can create potential vulnerabilities due to 
their immaturity.  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) generally detect unwanted 
manipulations to systems and is often referred to as an Anti-Virus application.  These 
systems are categorized as: Host-based and Network-based.  Host-based Intrusion 
detection Systems (HIDS) consists of an agent on a host which identifies intrusions by 
analyzing system calls, application logs, file-system modifications (binaries, password 
files, capability/acl databases) and other host activities and state.  A Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS) is an independent platform which identifies intrusions by 
examining network traffic and monitors multiple hosts.  Thus far, little has been 
accomplished to establish IDSs for IPv6 due to lack of demand. In order for IDSs to 
mature industry must establish rules against detection of what is known to be bad to what 
is not explicitly allowed.  This rule change will decrease the rules that need to be applied 
against every system request.   
Additional security concerns for IPv6 include features such as Secure Neighbor 
Discovery (SEND), Quality of Service (QoS), address auto configuration, and mobile IP.  
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SEND is a protocol that allows users to access domains while simultaneously securing 
the domain.  SEND is like the mail slot in a storefront.  Individuals can deliver mail to the 
mail slot but only the store owner can open the door and read the mail.  QoS is the 
capability of a network to provide better service to selected network traffic by prioritizing 
the request for information.  When requests are classified with higher priority QoS seeks 
to improve the flow of information.  Address auto configuration creates a link-local 
address and verifies its uniqueness on a link, then determines what information should be 
auto configured.  Mobile IP enables a router on a user’s home subnet to intercept and 
transparently forward IP packets, or information to users while they travel beyond 
network boundaries.  The security of this technology is essential to soldiers who will be 
operating with PDAs.   
Another significant issue surrounding the DoD’s security posture while fielding 
IPv6 is the widespread use of end-to-end IPSec.  IPSec establishes security over a 
network between a single sender and a single receiver.  This capability is useful when 
only trusted computers are allowed to access a server.  IPSec acts as a control for 
accessing applications and services running on the server.  The system will either encrypt 
or authenticate the traffic, depending on required level of security.   
Established policies and processes the DoD currently uses also have an impact on 
implementing IPv6.  The Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) has security 
provisions as well as connection approval processes for connecting to all DISN networks 
and the network interconnections among them.  In addition to these requirements all other 
networks within DoD have System Security Authorization Agreements, which are 
required by the DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation 
process (DITSCAP). 
3.   Ease System Management Burdens  
With the increase in address space that IPv6 brings one could imagine that 
managing an IPv6 network would require a significant increase in management resources.  
Fortunately, the designers of IPv6 recognized the limitations of IPv4 and implemented 
several improvements into IPv6.   
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IPv6 increases IP encryption from 32 to 128 bits.  This increase avoids potential 
exhaustion of address space and vulnerability to malicious attack.  Increasing the bits of 
the IP address also eliminates the need for Network Address Translation (NAT) and other 
devices that break the end-to-end nature of Internet traffic.  Eliminating the need for NAT 
is significant because source and/or destination addresses of IP packets will not require 
rewriting as they pass through a router or firewall.  Administrators will find managing the 
increase of address space easier since large blocks of address space can be allocated.  
This avoids fragmentation of the address space, which in turn leads to smaller routing 
tables.  
Another feature that IPv6 offers is Auto-configuration of Nodes.  Auto-
configuration will automatically configure devices without manual intervention.  This 
eliminates the need for software configuration programs or devices that close a break in a 
bypass to an electrical circuit.  Auto-configuration replaces Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP).  DHCP allows computer 
devices to use rules to allow the device to request and obtain an Internet address from a 
server.  This is essential because the server assigns the available addresses.  ARP is a 
method of finding a host’s hardware address when only its IP address is known.  This is 
vital when two hosts are on the same network and one is required to send a packet to the 
other.   
4.   Unlimited Address Availability 
Increasing the availability of address space is essential to the success of the 
DoD’s vision for a digital battlefield.  The concept of having every soldier and piece of 
equipment interconnected will require a significant amount of IP addresses.  This is the 
primary reason the DoD is pushing for the implementation of IPv6 by 2008.    
The 32 bit length of an IPv4 IP address has limited the available address space to 
4.3X109 addresses.  This may appear to be a significant amount of address space until 
you consider every cell phone, PDA, car, etc. will require an IP address.  This is where 
IPv6 shows its true potential as the address space solution for the next several decades.  
IPv6 has enough room for 3.4X1040 unique addresses.  This increase in address space can 
25 
equate to addressing each square inch of the planet earth and will satisfy the world’s 
requirements of IP addresses today, tomorrow, and into the foreseeable future.    
Increasing the IP address size from 32 to 128 bits enhances applications 
transparency.  Having significantly more transparency will alleviate the user from 
worrying about technical details such as: installing, updating, downloading, or installing 
device drivers.  Increased transparency can allow users to compress data automatically, 
which enables more files to be stored without manual encryption.  Transparency also 
establishes single uniform ways users perform individual computing.  The most 
significant aspect of transparency, relative to DoD, is location transparency. Users will 
not be required to know where a single user is located.  This enables the distributed 
architecture that DoD is striving to achieve.  Under a distributed architecture users will 
have the ability to access, share, and collaborate among user across the spectrum of 
operation seamlessly.       
L. ISSUES SURROUNDING DOD TRANSITION  
Many systems that utilize IPv4 addresses directly will have to be recoded to 
handle IPv6.  If the systems are old, this may no longer be feasible, and these systems 
will have to be replaced by newer models.  Many systems applications were custom-
written and the original writers are no longer available. New custom applications may 
have to be commissioned.  Many of the older systems do not contain hardware designed 
for easy reprogramming (i.e. firmware, EPROMs, etc.).  These systems will be very 
difficult to reprogram and test. Any reprogramming will be a lengthy process, with the 
need to test and debug any newly created software. 
In the case of “disruptive” systems (those that can only work under IPv6), and 
which portend great benefits, there of course can be no “transition”; the new hardware 
and software must be put in all at once.  Since everything is unlikely to work smoothly at 
first, a shakedown period must be allowed.  Depending on the transition mechanism, this 
may include special tunneling/translation mechanisms to accommodate older systems that 
cannot transition. IPv6 will increase complexity, delay deployment, and impact 
performance of the IPv6 systems being fielded.   
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M. MAINTAINING INTEROPERABILITY 
Program Managers (PMs) will need to ensure that the systems they manage 
maintain interoperability as they transition away from today’s IPv4-only environment.  
During the initial phases of transition, PMs are likely to move to an environment that 
accommodates IPv6 in a largely IPv4 environment, which leads to an ever-present dual 
stack environment where systems can operate in both IPv4 and IPv6.  As systems 
transition and the use of IPv4 diminish PMs will operate in an environment largely as an 
IPv6 network.  Hardware and software interoperability will be essential as PMs move 
forward with their IPv6 plans and interconnect their systems across dual environments.  
Since maintaining interoperability and security for these types of evolving environments 
is the highest priority, the transition period should be minimized.  
There are many possible combinations of technical IPv6 transition strategies.  
There are also a number of transition mechanisms (e.g. dual stack, tunneling, translation) 
which PMs can choose from with more emerging from the technical community.  The 
introduction of IPv6 on an enterprise scale will introduce a number of challenges 
including scalability, integration, and security.  In the near term, there is concern about 
creating vulnerabilities in existing IPv4 networks by deploying IPv6 and its transition 
mechanisms. (IPv6 Transition Guidance Federal CIO Council Architecture and 
Infrastructure Committee February 2006) 
N. SECURITY ISSUES 
The DoD is required to conduct risk assessments and develop security plans in 
accordance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and as 
required by National Security Policy, OMB Policy, and in accordance NIST standards 
and guidance as necessary. 
Several security implications of adopting IPv6 within a program are provided 
below as initial guidance to identify a network security infrastructure plan within each 
agency:   
• Security applications infrastructure currently used on an IPv4 network will 
need to be replicated, with an expectation that the same level of assurance 
is provided in the IPv6 network.  Examples of those applications are 
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Intrusion Detection, Firewalls, Network Management of IP Packets, Virus 
Detection, Intrusion Prevention, Secure Web Services Functions, etc. 
• If end-to-end IPsec security is to be implemented, there will be a need to 
identify PKI, key management, and policy management infrastructures 
that meet the scalability and security verification requirements for intra-
network communications (e.g. nodes, devices, and sensors). 
• If end-to-end IPsec security is implemented, the current network perimeter 
security infrastructure applications (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems) that depend on accessing and viewing IP transport data payloads 
must be aware they will not be able to view that part of the IP packet and 
alternate mechanisms should be deployed.  
• If VPN tunnels are used to encapsulate IPv4 within IPv6, or IPv6 within 
IPv4 as a transition method for deployment: 
• The tunnel endpoints between the VPN should be secured as the 
traffic transits the VPN. 
• When an encapsulated IPv6 packet enters or leaves the VPN and 
Intrusion Detection is required, it should be understood that the 
Intrusion Detection application or other network security method 
used to permit a packet on that network, has been ported to IPv6, 
as previously identified.  
• Wireless network access from IPv6 nodes requires in-depth security 
analysis for implementation when stateless auto-configuration is used, in 
addition to current methods to secure IPv4 wireless networks. 
• Seamless Mobility with IPv6 will need to support the required security as 
identified by the agency to permit secure access to the network whether 
across the internal network, or remotely from an external network. 
• IPv6 on a network should not be turned on by default unless all network 
security infrastructures are implemented.  (Note: Some products may have 
IPv6 enabled out-of-the-box.) 
With the current upgrade of networks environments, many products have IPv6 
capabilities already.  As with any new capability new threats and vulnerabilities will arise 
as attackers devote more attention to IPv6.  As such, careful planning and additional 
attention to operating in a dual environment will be needed to deal with potential new 
threats and must be addressed by the agencies accordingly.  (IPv6 Transition Guidance 




O. IPV6 STANDARDS AND PRODUCT EVOLUTION  
IPv6 technology is still evolving and this evolution is likely to continue through 
the DoD transition period.  This is as expected and is a normal evolution of the Internet 
standards.  While the base set of IPv6 protocols are stable and mature, and product 
implementations are emerging, many of the standards supporting value-added IPv6 
features are still evolving.  Many key IPv6 enabling protocols, especially for tactical 
wireless,  security, QOS, and transition mechanisms, are still in development and will not 
be completed at the current effort levels for the 2008 fielding.  The requirements for 
interoperability for IPv6 are from the DoD IT Standards Registry (DISR) IPv6 Standard 
Profiles for IPv6 Capable Products. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) has developed the (Department of Defense 
Internet Protocol Version 6 Generic Test Plan Version 2 dated September 2006) which 
describes the test and certification process for Commercial of The Shelve (COTS). 
Products certified are placed on an Approved Products List (APL) as IPv6 capable. The 
APL can be found at:  http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/adv_ip/register/register.html  
P. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION ISSUES 
Before any system deploys IPv6 it is important to test IPv6 within its network.  In 
some cases cross-agency collaboration for IPv6 testing of implementations will reduce 
efforts, but each agency will need to identify their specific network testing requirements.  
In addition, agencies can work with industry to test their network access and some of the 
IPv6 features that require wide-area-network testing.  The DoD certification process may 
pose a risk to the IPv6 transition schedule because of the newness of IPv6.  The testing 
process itself may not be mature when it is needed.  The certification may not be 
consistent with PM product selection practically if there is extensive use of COTS.  
The DoD has established criteria for Testing and Evaluation (T&E) strategies and 
processes and methodologies in order to gauge the progress being made towards the 
transition.  They are set forth in (Department of Defense Internet Protocol Version 6 
Generic Test Plan Version 2 dated September 2006) which can be found at 
https://gesportal.dod.mil/sites/JITCIPv6/TEWG . Each Fiscal Year (FY) the DoD 
compiles a T&E report detailing the progress made to date. The report gives the overall 
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status of DoD IPv6 T&E in support of the DoD’s transition to IPv6 and summarizes IPv6 
T&E results reported by all DoD Components.  Nineteen T&E reports were analyzed for 
the FY06 reporting period.  The report for FY06 titled: (The Fiscal Year 2006 
Department of Defense Internet Protocol Version 6 Test and Evaluation Report dated 
September 2006).  The report compiles the results of the 19 separate test reports.  The 
Joint Staff IPv6 10 Operational criteria and progress made to date follows. 
Criterion 1: Demonstrate security of unclassified network operations, classified 
network operations, black backbone operations, integration of HAIPE, integration of 
IPSec, and integration with firewalls and intrusion detection systems. 
• The IPv6 extension headers for IPSec have been successfully loaded with 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates and secure end-to-end 
communications have been demonstrated.  
• Security functions of routers (vulnerability scanning, support of SSH, 
secure management, password protection, and product integrity) have been 
successfully tested on routers selected for implementation.  
• Access Control Lists for IPv6 routers and firewalls have been successfully 
demonstrated.  
• No testing of HAIPE devices was performed. The National Security 
Agency (NSA) has developed technical specifications for HAIPE (version 
3). Technical analysis of the specifications was performed and 
recommendations were provided to NSA. HAIPE T&E by NSA requires 
the delivery of version 3 prototypes.  
• IPv6 packet inspection by firewalls has not been demonstrated. T&E will 
occur when firewall vendors produce IPv6 capable products.  
• IDS have not been tested. T&E will occur when IDS vendors produce 
IPv6 capable products.  
• IA certification and accreditation of IPv6 products and systems have not 
been accomplished. 
Criterion 2: Demonstrate end-to-end interoperability in a mixed IPv4 and IPv6 
environment. 
• Numerous tests were performed that analyzed the performance and 
interoperability of IPv6 implementations in hosts and routers. The results 
of the tests varied, depending on the router and its operating system. 
Newer routers and operating systems support the basic IPv6 features but 
require further development to satisfy DoD IPv6 capable requirements.  
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• The following features were successfully demonstrated in a mixed IPv4 
and IPv6 environment:  
• Stateless auto configuration  
• IPv6 routing protocols [Open Shortest Path First version 3 
(OSPFv3) and Border Gateway Protocol 4+(BGP4+)]  
• Internet control messages [Internet Control Message Protocol 
version 6 (ICMPv6)]  
• Common network applications (HTTP, SMTP, and FTP)  
• Network services [DNS/Berkeley Internet Name Domain 9 (BIND 
9) and Network Time Protocol (NTP)].  
• IPv6 mobility and multicasting features experienced problems in the beta 
version of the operating system tested.  
• Interoperability of IPv4 and IPv6 applications in mixed environments was 
demonstrated. The performance of the applications was on par with IPv4 
only networks compared with IPv4 and IPv6 mixed environments.  
Criterion 3: Demonstrate equivalent to, or better performance than IPv4 based 
networks.  
• Several high-end Layer 3 Ethernet switches and some routers deliver IPv4 
and IPv6 performance parity. Software implementations of IPv6 Layer 3 
Ethernet switches demonstrate lower performance when using IPv6 than 
when using IPv4.  
• The lack of IPv6 capable satellite IP modems and accelerators prevents 
deployment in a manner equivalent to IPv4. Overall, the current state of 
IPv6 used in tactical networks is immature and needs additional 
development and T&E before performance comparisons can be made with 
IPv4.  
• Bandwidth constrained IPv6 links, with bandwidths higher than 16 Kbps, 
demonstrate parity with IPv4. 
Criterion 4: Demonstrate voice, data, and video integration. 
• Limited testing of voice, data, and video integration was performed using 
a voice/video emulation test tool with routers from a single vendor. The 
routers operated properly in interpreting the IPv6 DiffServ code points and 
provided the required quality of service.  
• Further development and T&E is required to adequately demonstrate 




Criterion 5: Demonstrate effective operation in low-bandwidth environment.  
• Test results for low-bandwidth environments were not conclusive. 
Conclusions drawn from two test reports were contradictory and indicate 
further testing is needed.  
• Bandwidth constrained links with bandwidths higher than 16 Kbps are not 
negatively affected using native IPv6 in comparison to IPv4 over the same 
network. For bit rates below 16 Kbps, IPv6 throughput was much lower 
than IPv4.  
• Use of dual stack techniques appeared to degrade performance on links 
below 2 Mbps. IPv6 parity with IPv4 was demonstrated using dual stack 
techniques with links above 2 Mbps.  
Criterion 6: Demonstrate scalability of IPv6 networks.  
• No scalability analysis of IPv6 networks has been performed, as there is 
currently insufficient data to populate network models and simulations.  
Criterion 7: Demonstrate support for mobile terminals (voice, data, and video).  
• Limited mobility testing was conducted this reporting period and attempts 
to use IPv6 mobility were unsuccessful. Immature vendor 
implementations are a serious and systemic problem in fielding MIPv6, 
NEMO, and MANET.  
Criterion 8: Demonstrate transition techniques (details explained in subsequent 
sections).  
• Five transition mechanisms are recommended: dual stack (within host OS 
and network devices), manual configured tunnel, automatic tunneling, 
Application Layer Gateway (ALG), and Stateless IP/ICMP Translation 
(SIIT).  
• Dual stack transition techniques appear to create the most flexible strategy 
to allow coexistence of IPv4 and IPv6 applications.  
Criterion 9: Demonstrate ability to provide network management of networks.  
• Testing shows that IPv6 network management tools have been 
implemented to a limited extent. More development of IPv6 network 
management tools and T&E is required to demonstrate this criterion.  
• The Government Off The Shelf (GOTS) network management tool 
C2RMS, as modified by the Air Force, resulted in important lessons 
learned in transitioning applications to IPv6. 
• Of the routers and switches tested, the majority did not support the 
SNMPv3 Management Information Base (MIB).  
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Criterion 10: Demonstrate tactical deployability and ad hoc networking so 
systems can operate wirelessly.  
• Simplified Multicast Forwarding (SMF) T&E indicates further 
development is required to support MANET multicasting.  
• The WIN-T prototype nodes demonstrated IPv6 connectivity on the move 
and at the halt.  
• Significantly more work remains for T&E of the tactical deployability and 
ad hoc networking capabilities of IPv6. (The Fiscal Year 2006 Department 
of Defense Internet Protocol Version 6 Test and Evaluation Report dated 
September 2006) 
Q. WHAT ARE THE TRANSITION MECHANISMS AND STRATEGIES 
REGARDING IPV6? 
Over the next several years the DoD has mandated that all networks and the 
global Internet transition to IPv6.  This transition has been planned on an incremental 
basis and, therefore, there will be a period where IPv4 and IPv6 traffic must co-exist.  
The strategies PMs must utilize must take into account systems that must operate and 
support IPv4/IPv6 interoperability over the lifecycle of their systems.  Further, PMs must 
follow all applicable guidance authorities including DoD level and Army level. 
R. IPV4 AND IPV6 CO-EXISTENCE 
Interoperability between IPv4 and IPv6 can be achieved using one or a 
combination of the following transition mechanisms: dual stack, tunneling, and 
translation.  Interoperability needs to be maintained not only among the PM Systems, but 
also with all DoD Systems that interact with those systems and with the GIG, joint and 
multinational forces, and other connecting networks.  The biggest challenge will be to 
maintain interoperability during the transition period. Interoperability between IPv4 and 
IPv6 hosts with different functional protocols will be a challenge. During the transition 
period there may be a difference in performance between IPv4 sessions and IPv6 
sessions.  
S. TRANSITION ANALYSIS 
Areas that need to be considered include multicast, addressing architecture, DNS 
and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) architecture, IA, applications, and 
QoS.   The other area that should be assessed is the transition scenarios. The goal of the 
transition analysis is to provide recommendations that are best suited and based upon 
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each system’s capability, logistics and schedule.  Technology maturity of transition 
mechanisms and maturity of IP devices on each system should be considered.   The key 
parameters to the trade space are when the systems transition during its lifecycle and to 
what the system transitions.  
1.   Pre-Deployment Transition 
For pre-deployment transition, the baseline design changes from an IPv4-capable 
to an IPv6-capable system during the design phase.  The focus of the pre-deployment 
transition analysis should center on the ramifications of transition mechanism technology 
and network architecture options including: dual stacks, tunneling, and translation.  
2.  Dual Stack 
The term “dual stack” refers to TCP/IP capable devices providing support for both 
IPv4 and IPv6.  Dual stack allows a device to communicate over both IPv4 and IPv6 but 
does not necessarily mean all applications operating within this device are capable of 
utilizing both IPv4 and IPv6.  The term “dual stack routing” refers to a network that is 
dual IP, that is to say all routers must be able to route both IPv4 and IPv6.  Requiring all 
new devices be both IPv4 and IPv6 capable permits these devices to have the ability to 
use either IP protocol version, depending on the services available, the network 
availability, service, and the administrative policy.  A transition scenario which calls for 
“dual stack everywhere” provides the most flexible operational environment.  Dual 
stacked hosts running on a dual stack network allow applications to migrate one at a time 
from IPv4 transport to IPv6 transport.  Legacy applications and devices that are not yet 
upgraded to support access to the IPv6 stack can coexist with upgraded IPv6 applications 
on the same network system.   
(IPv6 Transition Guidance Federal CIO Council Architecture and Infrastructure 
Committee February 2006) 
3.   Tunnels  
“Tunneling” is a means to encapsulate one version of IP in another so the packets 
can be sent over a router that does not support the encapsulated IP version.  When two 
isolated IPv6 networks need to communicate over an IPv4 network, dual stack routers at 
the network edges can be used to set up a tunnel which encapsulates the IPv6 packets 
within IPv4, allowing the IPv6 systems to communicate without having to upgrade the 
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IPv4 network infrastructure that exists between the networks. (IPv6 Transition Guidance 
Federal CIO Council Architecture and Infrastructure Committee February 2006) 
4. Translation  
The term “translators” refers to devices capable of translating traffic from IPv4 to 
IPv6 or vice and versa.  This mechanism is intended to eliminate the need for dual stack 
network operation by translating traffic from IPv4-only devices to operate within an IPv6 
infrastructure.  This option is recommended only as a last resort because translation 
interferes with objective of end-to-end transparency in network communications. Use of 
protocol translators cause problems with Network Address Translation (NAT) and highly 
constrain the use of IP-addressing. (IPv6 Transition Guidance Federal CIO Council 
Architecture and Infrastructure Committee February 2006) 
T. POST-DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION 
For a post-deployment transition, the trade analysis should cover the 
programmatic approach to the transition (retrofit vs. technology refresh) during the 
systems lifecycle, after an IPv4-only system has been deployed.   Two transition 
scenarios should be considered for the post-deployment phase in the system lifecycle: 
retrofit and technology refresh.   
1.   Retrofit 
A retrofit transition requires an upgrade of IP devices and related software after 
initial deployment of an IPv4-only architecture.  This transition scenario assumes the 
devices to be replaced are still in good working order, but lack IPv6 capability, therefore, 
retrofit is performed.  A retrofit transition may occur at any time in the system’s lifecycle 
after initial deployment, but prior to a scheduled technology refresh.  The primary benefit 
of a retrofit transition is it relaxes the transition schedule and allows each system to 
transition on its own schedule, tailored to individual program maturity and funding. The 
major disadvantage of this strategy is it is costly.  A retrofit replaces hardware and 
software that is in good working order (other than not being IPv6 capable).   
2.   Technology Refresh 
A technology refresh transition is defined as the periodic replacement of system 
components (in this case IP devices and associated software) to assure continued 
supportability throughout the system’s lifecycle.  This transition occurs during the natural 
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technology refresh cycle, based upon anticipated wear-out or obsolescence of devices.  
The timing of this transition is assumed to occur as far into the future as possible; 
however some devices would transition earlier than others, depending upon individual 
tech refresh schedules.  The major advantage of transitioning during a technology refresh 
is it assumes the cost of the hardware and software is included in the technology refresh 
budget.  Also, an overall cost savings can be assumed, because this late-in-the-lifecycle 
transition leverages the cost of future devices which are typically less expensive.  
However, there are many disadvantages to this as a program-wide transition scenario.  
The primary issue is government and military technology refresh cycles can be up to 25 
years.  This may be too far in the future to be acceptable.  Another issue involves 
interoperability risk associated with the management of a technology refresh and its role 
in the IPv6 transition.  Technology refresh programs such as capability enhancement or 
obsolescence management are typically performed as separate activities, and are 
therefore often disjointed.  Also, it is unclear whether a transition to IPv6 is considered an 
“upgrade”.  Some DoD programs may define technology refresh in a way that excludes 
any cost and planning associated with “upgrades”; therefore it may be inappropriate to 
expect the cost and planning to be incurred in a technology refresh.  This matter needs to 
be clarified with the Army.  
U. GUIDANCE AUTHORITIES 
The overall guidance authorities are categorized as DoD level, Army level, and 
PM level.  The scope of authority, certification process, and waiver process is described 
for each guidance authority. 
• DoD Level IPv6 Transition Guidance Authority 
1.   ASD(NII)/DoD CIO  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks and Information Integration, 
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO) is the top level 
authority for DoD Information Technology Systems.  The ADS(NII)/DoD CIO grants all 
DoD IPv6 authority.  The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO has the final authority in approving all 
DoD IPv6 Guidance documentation. 
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2.   DoD IPv6 Mandate 
ASD(NII)/DoD CIO issued a policy memo on June 9, 2003 that directed all DoD 
departments and agencies to begin the transition to enterprise-wide deployment of IPv6 
for the GIG and all networks. A subsequent memo on September 29, 2003 provided 
additional guidance on three points: 1) What is IPv6 Capable 2) Standards Profile 3) 
Provisional Waiver Process.  The June 9, 2003 “IPv6 Mandate” memo can be found at: 
http://www.dod.mil/nii/org/cio/doc/IPV6.pdf    
3.   DoD IPv6 Transition Plan 
The Office of ASD(NII)/DoD CIO has written the DoD IPv6 Transition Plan.  
The DoD IPv6 Transition Plan describes the overall strategy for IPv6 transition, identifies 
roles and responsibilities, and establishes implementation governance.  Additionally, the 
plan contains guidance on: obtaining IPv6 capable products; testing and demonstrations; 
responsibilities and considerations for transitioning networks, applications, and 
infrastructure; the criteria for demonstrating transition readiness; and the strategy for 
leveraging ongoing commercial IPv6 work. 
4.   DoD IPv6 Master Test Plan 
The Office of ASD(NII)/DoD CIO has written the DoD IPv6 Master Test Plan.  
The DoD IPv6 Master Test Plan defines the overall IPv6 Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
strategy, identifies the organizations responsible for carrying out the strategy, and 
identifies the challenges that may impede IPv6 implementation.  The DoD IPv6 Master 
Test Plan establishes a reporting process that promotes information sharing of test plans 
and results across the DoD. 
5.  Certification 
ASD(NII)/DoD CIO has the final authority to certify a system is IPv6 Capable.  
For this certification to be granted, the system must complete the Joint Interoperability 
Test Command (JITC) interoperability certification.  JITC certification will require a 
system to support the Defense Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR) 
profile standards that is applicable to the required functionality of a system.  
ASD(NII)/DoD CIO will work through component organizations (Army) to grant 
certification.  The Army has identified the Army System Engineering Office (ASEO) as 
having the responsibility to process and evaluate IPv6-capable certification and submit 
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recommendations to the CIO/G-6.  The CIO/G-6 will directly support the DoD IPv6 
Transition Office and will represent the Army.  The CIO/G-6 will make 
recommendations to the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO. 
6.   Waiver Process 
Where it does not appear feasible to transition as mandated, a waiver in 
accordance with the process discussed in the DoD IPv6 Transition Plan is required. This 
may be due to a procurement or development in which the requirements cannot be 
complied, or legacy systems which are not expected to remain in service beyond five 
years.  Component CIOs can waive the IPv6 requirement based on the above criteria. 
Component CIOs may not re-delegate this waiver authority. The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO 
must be notified of any waivers granted and provided with the rationale ten days prior to 
the effective date of the waiver for final approval purposes. Any procurement waivers 
granted should generally be for one year or less, given the expected increased availability 
of IPv6 capable products. The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO is the final approval authority for any 
IPv6 procurement /transition waiver decisions. In addition, the ASD (NII)/DoD CIO will 
coordinate with Component Acquisition Executives and Program Executive Offices 
(PEOs) on any joint, defense-wide or Intelligence Community (IC) programmatic IPv6 
issues. The Department of the Army has identified ASEO as having the responsibility to 
process and evaluate IPv6 waivers and submit recommendations to the CIO/G-6. The 
CIO/G-6 will directly support the DoD IPv6 Transition Office and will represent the 
Army in coordinating activities among the DoD, the joint services, allies, and coalition 
forces. 
7.   Defense Information Systems Agency 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is granted authority from 
ASD(NII)/DoD.  DISA is responsible for the operation of large components of the DoD 
GIG.  DISA responsibilities include: 
• Coordinating DoD’s IPv6 standards efforts including working with 
industry, IETF, ITU, IEEE, and other standards bodies to ensure DoD 
needs are reflected in evolving IPv6 standardization efforts 
• Acquiring, allocating and managing IPv6 address space for the DoD 
• Providing top-level IPv6 Domain Name System (DNS) support for the 
DoD, including Internet root server(s) 
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• Interoperability testing and certification for IPv6 products and capabilities 
• Ensuring end-to-end IA issues associated with Defense Information 
System Network (DISN) transition to IPv6 are resolved 
DISA has established a DoD IPv6 Transition Office (DITO) that provides the 
overall technical coordination, engineering, guidance and assistance across DoD, which 
is needed to support an integrated and coherent transition. This office is responsible for 
providing common engineering solutions and guidelines designed from an enterprise 
perspective. It is responsible for coordinating transition planning, analysis, testing, and 
implementation efforts across DoD. Additionally, it is responsible for implementing a 
systematic program of outreach with the DoD community, promoting knowledge sharing, 
and ensuring needed infrastructure is provided. It will ensure critical transition issues are 
prioritized and addressed. 
8.   Defense IT Standards Registry 
DISR maintains the official DISA set of DoD Standards Profiles.  These DISR 
standards profiles are used to develop the definition of “IPv6 Capable.”  “IPv6 Capable” 
shall mean “a device must pass the IPv6 core requirements, support transition 
mechanisms to be interoperable with IPv4, support the IPv6 security profile, support at 
least one (or more) IPv6 capable connection technologies, support requirements for one 
(or more) functional categories: host, router/switch, security device, network server; and 
support the IPv6 version of any other requirements necessary for its function on the GIG, 
and is verified by test or demonstration in the laboratory.”  DISR standards for all 
networking technologies are contained on the DISROnline web site at 
http://disronline.disa.mil.  A DISROnline account is required to view this site.  The 
Mandated DISR IPv6 Capable Profiles are found at: 
https://disronline.disa.mil/a/DISR/view_kip_family.jsp?spId=807. 
The Emerging DISR IPv6 Capable Profiles can be found at: 
https://disronline.disa.mil/a/DISR/view_kip_family.jsp?spId=807. 
9.   IPv6 Capable Certification Process 
IPv6 Capable certification will come through a process of tailoring the DISR IPv6 




After applicable IPv6 Capable DISR standards are identified, the program will develop 
an applicable product implementation..  After full JITC approval, a product will be 
considered IPv6 Capable. 
10.   DISA Joint Interoperability Test Command 
JITC is an independent operational and test evaluation assessor of DISA.  JITC 
provides joint and combined interoperability testing, evaluation, and certification for C4I 
systems.  JITC will perform IPv6 performance and load testing, routing interoperability 
tests.  JITC will also perform IPv6 application and transition mechanism testing and 
evaluate end-to-end interoperability in mixed IPv4/IPv6 environments. JITC will develop 
and maintain an IPv6 vendor and DoD equipment, software, hardware and applications 
interoperability matrix and an IPv6 capable APL.  JITC will also participate in DoD IPv6 
working group meetings. 
11.   National Security Agency  
The National Security Agency (NSA) is a component of the DoD under the 
command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The NSA protects US Government information 
systems.  The NSA has the authority to require information assurance certification and 
accreditation of DoD information systems.  The NSA is developing, in conjunction with 
the appropriate Components, a set of IA guidelines and solutions for implementing IPv6 
within the department.  Of particular urgency is the need for IA guidelines in support of 
early IPv6 pilots.  In addition, NSA has developed version 3 of the HAIPE specification, 
which is IPv6 capable. HAIPE functionality and performance characteristics are being 
developed in conjunction with the Components and will support DoD’s transition 
objectives.   The NSA will work closely with DISA and the Services in the development 
of an IPv6 network and IA design with the goal of ensuring a timely, secure and 
operationally effective IPv6 environment.  In addition, the NSA will ensure that the GIG 
end-to-end IA architecture, which is in development, addresses IPv6 as an integral 
component.  The NSA GIG Architecture Group is the mechanism for resolving these 
issues. 




12.   Army IPv6 Mandate 
On Nov 5, 2003, the Army CIO/G-6 issued a memo that mandates the Army will 
transition to IPv6.  Another Army memo providing further IPv6 guidance was issued on 
April 1, 2004. 
13.   Army Transition Management Structure  
The Army has established an IPv6 Transition Plan Working Group (ITPWG) to 
serve as the umbrella organization to regulate and control the governance, development, 
implementation, and management of the transition within the Army. The ITPWG is co-
chaired by the Army Chief Information Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff (CIO/G-6); the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), (ASA(ALT)); 
and the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM).  The ITPWG reports to 
the CIO Executive Board. The ITPWG works through DISA and with ASEO to influence 




IV.   STEPS PROGRAMS MANAGERS MUST TAKE TO 
TRANSITION PROGRAM OF RECORD (POR) SYSTEMS FROM 
IPV4 TO IPV6 
A. ALLOCATION OF ADDRESS SPACE? 
The ability of the DoD to move into digital warfare establishes a competitive 
advantage over opposing threats.  Giving commanders and warfighters the capability to 
communicate and share intelligence across the full spectrum of operations, will contribute 
to the aptitude for the United States Armed Forces remaining, the world’s premier 
superpower well into the foreseeable future.  This ongoing effort is the largest 
undertaking by the joint services to date and will require the coordination and ingenuity 
of thousands of people, organizations, and industry partners in order to succeed.  
The technology of tomorrow will encompass an array of built-in sensors that will 
allow soldiers and commanders to monitor core body temperature, hydration levels, sleep 
status, and other critical physiological information.   
B. ADDRESSING PLAN FOR THE DOD 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Network and Information 
Infrastructure (OSD NII) directed the DoD to incorporate IPv6 and operate in a dual 
IPv4/IPv6 capacity.  The direction to incorporate IPv6 and operate in a dual IP capacity 
for the foreseeable future is essential to the foundation of interoperability across the DoD.  
Operating in a dual mode will ensure that the cutover to IPv6 will not end the 
effectiveness of fielded systems supporting wartime efforts.  Most of the systems in need 
of upgrade or replacement are procured from commercial vendors and DoD contractors.  
Upgrading systems also impacts routing and data distribution.   
Top down organizations such as the DoD have problems because OSD establishes 
policy and dictates implementation to the services.  Once the services receive direction 
and implement across the force, individual programs are left to design solutions.  This top 
down approach seldom takes into account the sensibility from a system level.  Systems 
such as the Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) provide commanders targeting capability 
through the use of the Interactive Broadcast Service (IBS).  The JTT has been directed to 
42 
be IPv6 compliant, yet the JTT will never need IPv6 to function.  The host system into 
which the JTT is integrated must be IPv6 compliant, which makes the JTT IPv6 
compliant.  This confusion has caused the JTT program office to submit an IPv6 waiver, 
which consumed many man hours to produce and staff.   
The DoD operates under a “top down” philosophy that has proven inefficient.  
The DoD should strive to incorporate a horizontal approach to establishing policy and 
decision making.  Horizontal organizations develop cross functional teams to address and 
solve problems.  Utilizing cross functional teams allows stakeholders at every level to 
provide input into the decision making process.  This ensures that working level issues 
are discussed among subject matter experts before direction and policy is solidified.  
Horizontal organizations focus on external rather than internal results of decisions.  
Increasing coordination between each level within DoD will enhance morale, efficiency, 
and soldier support.  The DoD is striving to incorporate the Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) at program levels.  IPTs are cross functional teams designed to incorporate various 
elements of the acquisition process. This eliminates waste by ensuring every element of 
the acquisition process is addressed simultaneously.  IPTs ensure functional disciplines 
within an organization are communicating and expressing concerns that impact a 
program.  DoD has directed organizations at a lower level to incorporate these new 
acquisition principles and has not integrated them into their own processes.   
The addressing plan the IPv6 Transition Office (DITO), Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), and the representative Services (Army, Navy and the Air 
Force) agree on is feasible from a service standpoint.  However, another option to 
consider when transitioning under the time phased approach is to convert the core 
networks to IPv6 and then convert the access level networks and application hosts to 
IPv6.  This would require the DoD to develop an IPv6 Core as the basis for transition.  
The Core would include the DISN/GIG/BE (SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and JWICS).  Once 
the core networks are established, IPv4 application traffic will be able to communicate on 




mechanisms, which themselves introduce a great deal of complexity.  The end result will 
occur when enough IPv6 applications generate a significant amount of traffic to enable 
the IPv4 traffic to discontinue.      
C. NETWORKS 
Having separate networks such as NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS, creates 
various challenges when dealing with IPv6 transition.  Anyone who works on a top secret 
project and does not work in a SCIF will explain that having separate networks is a 
challenge.  This is especially true when working with organizations that operate on 
SIPRNET daily.  Workers often have to check SIPRENT email in a secure room that may 
be remotely located away from their office.  Other problems arise when workers are 
unaware that an email marked as “SECRET” has been sent to their SIPRNET account.  
These emails may go unchecked for days until the worker is notified such information 
has been transmitted.   
The separate networks that the DoD manages must be kept separate for security 
purposes.  When IPv6 transition starts to disseminate across the various networks 
managing the separate classification levels will be challenging.  Administrators will have 
to ensure that only networks operating at the same classification can connect to peers 
with IPv6 addresses.  This issue also affects our Allied and Coalition networks, which 
need to be segregated from operational DoD networks of similar classification.   
D. DOD NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER IPV6 ADDRESS 
MANAGEMENT  
The DoD is a hierarchical structure in which every entity in the organization, 
except one, is subordinate to a single other entity.  Structuring organizations this way can 
decrease communication by limiting information flow.  Problems erupt when the 
communication between hierarchical organizations gets distorted by the time it reaches 
the end of the line.  This form of distortion is often referred to as telephoning, where 
information is transferred from a sender to a receiver and is distorted each time the 
information is transferred.  
Allowing the MIL NIC, Service NICs, and Agency NICs to allocate address space 
in a hierarchical manner increases IPv6 transition efficiency.  When agencies apply for 
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address space they will be required to demonstrate a valid need.  These requests will be 
elevated to the next level in the hierarchical structure.  Once that level gathers the total 
requirement it will request one total amount of space to the next level.  Operating the 
request process in this fashion will increase the understanding that each NIC has on their 
requirements.   
A successful transition requires utilizing administration practices that are 
successful under current Ipv4 practices.  Allowing DoD NICs to continue the 
maintenance of DNS servers, zone files, and delegate subordinate zones for their 
respective forward DNS zones maintains consistent configuration control over processes 
already in place.          
E. ESTIMATING COST TO TRANSITION POR SYSTEMS FROM IPV4 TO 
IPV6 
The Department of Defense has established a goal that all GIG IT assets are to 
transition from the current IPv4 to the newly developing IPv6 by FY08.  The current 
DoD transition estimate makes some overriding assumption and  extends the transition 
period until FY16, which reduces the transition cost by approximately 50% or $1.6B 
(Director, Technical Architecture Division Architecture Operations Network & Space 
CIO/G-6).  The assumption was made to reduce the cost to the DoD on the intent for 
transition to be implemented with Technology Refresh whenever feasible.   
F. OVERALL DOD ESTIMATE TO MEET MANDATE 
The guidance to transition legacy systems using Technology Refresh or Software 
Block upgrade programs and pre-deployment systems designed to IPv4/IPv6 capability 
system during the development phase provide the DoD with the frame work to estimate 
the overall cost.  The major cost drivers for implementing the pre-deployment transition 
include: 
• Increased System Memory to Handle IPv6 and Dual stack Mechanism 
• Increased System Processor Overhead to Handle IPv6 and Dual stack 
Mechanism 
• Certifications 
• Increase in Required Bandwidth to Handle IPv6 and Dual stack 
Mechanism 
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• Additional Dual stack Software 
• Interoperability testing 
The cost can be estimated using standard software and hardware estimating 
models such as Constructive Cost Model COCOMO for software development based on 
the above drivers.  The hardware estimates are not viewed as the major cost driver due to 
the pace with which commercial industry is providing greater capability at reduced cost.  
The assumption that Moore’s Law (stating transistor density of integrated circuits, with 
respect to minimum component cost, doubles every 24 months) will continue to hold true 
in the future is relatively conservative given the industry’s past performance   The cost 
will, in large part, be driven by maturity of the design for the system in question.  For 
systems that have yet to reach Preliminary Design Review (PDR), the design changes to 
support IPv6 will be much easier.  For systems that have reached or passed Critical 
Design Review (CDR), rework required will be far greater.  The insertion of previously 
approved software and hardware products from the JITC APL, whenever possible, can 
alleviate much of its additional cost.   The government could work with their respective 
contractors in order to estimate the cost of the transition.  The government must also 
generate an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) in order to gain a full appreciation for the 
additional funding required.  The government must also take into account the additional 
interoperability and certification testing required for the transition.  
Transition guidance for legacy systems using Technology Refresh or Software 
Block upgrade programs must be implemented carefully.  The fact that tactical networks 
are inherently low-bandwidth requires detailed modeling and simulation and laboratory 
testing before these systems can be upgraded to support IPv6.  The effects on tactical 
network operations and the performance of these systems must be understood before any 
transition decision is made.   Systems with sufficient throughput should transition using 
their normal technology refresh/software upgrade schedules.  The additional cost to 
transition to IPv6 can be determined using the methodology outlined above.  Those 




capacity only.  If these systems are not planned for obsolescence within the mandated 
five year window, then the waiver process must be followed and replacement systems 
identified for future upgrades.   
G. ARMY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICES (PEO) ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
TRANSITION COST ESTIMATES 
Transitioning programs of record to IPv6 is a monumental task that will require 
significant resource commitments.  For this reason, the Army needs to take account of all 
input gathered from the PEOs before allocating resources.  When the Army makes 
decisions and sets direction before data can be analyzed, significant amounts of rework 
are required to meet the desired performance end-state.  
The Army is preparing to use technology refresh funding to accomplish a 
significant portion of the transition to IPv6.  This decision was made as a result of the 
“good enough drill”, which eliminated the majority of funds that would have been used 
for technology refresh for the Battle Field Functional Areas (BFAs).  To further 
complicate this scenario, Joint Command and Control (JC2) is slated to replace 
Command and Control (C2). JC2 has not provided any POM funding information for 
transition.  Decisions such as this are made independently of the policy maker’s 
knowledge and impact implementation.  Presently, the JC2 BFA has no funding 
associated with its requirements to transition to IPv6.   
H. BENEFIT TO THE DOD OF TRANSITION 
1.   Interoperability  
In order to achieve true interoperability and seamless information sharing, the 
DoD must first embrace Net-centricity, rather than data movement.  Data movement 
simply transports information to another location.  Net-centricity empowers soldiers with 
the ability to discover, access, integrate, correlate and fuse information and data that 
support their mission objectives. Interoperability would only be one of many supporting 
attributes.      
Achieving Net-centricity requires synergizing people, organizations, processes, 
information and materiel. Material should be dealt with last. The DoD needs to address  
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businesses-process redesign first, and then focus on the people, organization and 
information needed to support it.  In the end, technology will only benefit organizations 
equipped to receive advanced solutions.  
The largest hurdles organizations will face when transiting to IPv6 are people, 
organization and processes. The people of an organization have the information.  
Attempting to retrieve the information will require a cultural change.  Changing the way 
people access information from a need-to-know basis to a need-to-share environment is a 
challenge the DoD has yet to face.   
2.   Improved End-to-End Security  
Preventing intrusion into a DoD network and improving end-to-end security are 
the most important aspects of IPv6 transition.  More work needs to be done to increase 
the availability and quality of IDSs.  To date, the only country that is proactive in 
promoting IDSs is Japan, which has recognized the need to develop IDSs and is taking 
steps to ensure IPv6 networks are protected from intrusion.  Without adequate IDSs, DoD 
networks become vulnerable to intrusion, which can jeopardize both life and property.  
With little work being done on IPv6 IDSs, organizations will be playing catch-up 
afterwards, with increased potential for network compromise.   
The other security features of IPv6 increase security but only if properly 
implemented and continually monitored.  Without SEND, DoD networks will be left 
vulnerable to intrusion when accessing other databases.  Prioritizing network traffic using 
QoS will enable time-critical information to reach the commander.  Having the right 
information at the right time is essential to managing wartime efforts.  Mobile IP and auto 
configuration are essential to the individual warfighter who will be utilizing information 
while on the move.   
End-to-end IPSec is essential when implementing a Net-centric architecture 
because users are classified with various security clearance levels.  Users requiring top 
secret information will be verified through IPSec for the required security credentials 




Net-centric environment allows all users regardless of security classification level to 
operate on the network and share information that is essential to the success of their 
mission.  
Implementing the appropriate security controls associated with IPv6 is 
challenging and will require significant resources to manage.  It is only when DoD can 
successfully implement required security provisions as well as connecting appropriate 
security classification levels will the vision of Net-centric warfare be achieved.   
3.   Ease System Management Burdens  
Proliferation of wireless devices has increased the amount of IP addresses.  Today 
there is more pressure than ever to keep networks flexible and available. Failure to 
automate networks with a robust and scalable management solution can increase 
management burdens and lead to serious complications.  
Achieving seamless operation requires an inventory of address space that resides 
in a centralized database to ease management burdens.  Address space is the fundamental 
entity that allows networks to communicate.  Maintaining the accuracy and consistency 
of the address space will ensure continued network operation.  Managing the centralized 
database requires updates when address space allocations are granted by the next higher 
authority.  Failure to maintain accurate address space inventories will complicate network 
traffic and prevent users from accessing information.  This potentially serious 
complication can lead to life threatening situations when commanders need to access 
time-critical information needed for decision-making.   
Auto-configuration of nodes is essential from a mobile warfighting force 
perspective.  Auto-configuration allows users to connect a device to a network with 
minimal configuration.  This is essential when a user is traveling on the battlefield 
because the soldier will enter areas where the network may change.  Auto-configuration 
allows the user to seamlessly access information in the new network.  Without it, users 
would need to re-address their IP, which takes time and can jeopardize their safety or 




4.   Unlimited Address Availability 
The reality of connecting every soldier via electronic communications on the 
battlefield is clearly a significant goal for the DoD.  Fortunately, this challenge is 
achievable with IPv6.  Enabling the soldier to communicate and share information across 
the full spectrum of operation will ensure the United States Armed Forces remains the 
world’s superior fighting force.   
I. ISSUES SURROUNDING DOD TRANSITION 
DoD transition, which was originally mandated to be completed by FY08, has 
been extended to FY16 in order to minimize transition cost.  It is important that planned 
and programmed systems be acquired with support for both IPv6 and IPv4.  This must 
include ensuring the following: 
• The requirements for all DoD developed products include both IPv6 and 
IPv4 support. 
• Commercial products selected include both IPv6 and IPv4 support. 
• Coexistence strategies must be developed to ensure interoperability with 
legacy systems until the transition is complete. 
1.  Maintaining Interoperability 
The many legacy systems built on IPv4 pose several issues for migration to IPv6.  
The overall DoD mandate, to transition systems to IPv6 that are greater then five years 
from obsolescence (Department Of The Army Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) 
Transition Plan (Phase 1)), has implications for both the products themselves as well as 
the system’s architecture.  For systems that contain commercial hardware or software, 
performing system upgrades to support both IPv6 and IPv4 will be relatively 
straightforward. Most commercial product vendors are currently supporting both protocol 
versions, or have plans to do so in the near future. Also, the commercial product vendors 
will be responsible for maintaining their products in response to changes in the IPv6 
standards. 
DoD systems that were developed solely for military application pose a far greater 
challenge.  The acquisition cycles and product lifetimes for these systems are usually 
substantially longer than commercial technology cycles, particularly for tactical-level 
systems.  Furthermore, the communications systems that comprise the tactical networks 
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have extremely low bandwidths (hundreds to thousands of bps) by commercial standards, 
and potentially very long delays (e.g., >0.25 seconds on SATCOM links).  Because of 
these challenges, tactical systems are highly optimized in terms of network usage.  For 
example, in the Army’s Lower Tactical Internet, UDP/IP headers for situation awareness 
(SA) traffic are not transmitted over-the-air and TCP is rarely used because of its 
overhead. (Implementer Ipv6 Transition Plan For Program Executive Office Command, 
Control, and Communications Tactical (PEO C3T) dated 24 May 2004) 
A potential concern with IPv6 is the header size, which is twice as large as the 
IPv4 header or 20 bytes.  This could impact performance although header compression 
schemes can mitigate this impact, careful testing in a realistic environment is needed 
prior to deployment since IPv6 header compression is immature.  The issue of optional 
extension headers used by IPv6, will further decrease bandwidth efficiency.  The 
resulting bandwidth requirement increase may make transition impractical for some 
tactical handheld, man packed, and vehicle mounted systems.  This may, in turn, have 
cascading effects on other tactical networks, applications, and supported systems. 
Simultaneous dual stack operation may be impractical from a tactical battlefield 
management issue.  This could significantly impact transition strategy, cost, and risk. 
The assumption that legacy systems will be obsolete in five years or less entails 
high risk.  The systems that are currently in development and slated to replace legacy 
system are more often than not, delayed in development due to factors such as technical 
challenges, funding shortfalls, cost overruns, and schedule delays.  It is projected that the 
legacy systems will be required far longer then the projected five year time frame.  The 
assumption that the Army will obtain IPV6 Upgrade through FCS, WIN-T, and JTRS 
implies total replacement of existing systems.  This may not be supportable in practice 
and is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.  The current systems will be in the 
field for the foreseeable future. Current Force and Future Force systems will have to be 
interoperable.  All new systems fielded will be required to support both IPv4 and IPv6 
protocols for the foreseeable future.  
New systems may obtain dual IPv6 and IPv4 capability with the use of 
commercial products. In cases where commercial products are not available, custom 
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develop IPv6/IPv4 capability must be implemented.  These cases are of particular 
concerns in the near term because IPv6 standards and IPv4-IPv6 transition mechanisms 
are not fully mature. Developments started before standards mature run the risk of 
incurring increased maintenance costs to keep pace with changes in IPv6 standards. To 
mitigate this risk, DoD-unique developments must be implemented in a way to facilitate 
changes to the IP protocol as it matures with strong layered architecture that separates out 
the network/IP layer.   
J. SECURITY ISSUES 
Many of the threats to today’s IPv4 network security will not disappear with the 
deployment of IPv6. This includes vulnerabilities in higher layer protocols and services 
within the network. In addition, changes under the IPv6 protocol may yield new, as yet 
unknown, vulnerabilities. 
Since IPSec will be available at the network layer, this could facilitate expanded 
use. Applications will not have to implement IPSec, but can merely make calls to the 
operating system socket layers to use IPSec. Since this feature will be available on all 
devices that implement the IPv6 protocol, host-to-host security associations can be easily 
defined with this base technology, an ability which does not exist with IPv4. 
The DoD relies heavily on Type-1 encryptors on their networks. Historically, 
encryption has been provided either at the physical layer for encryption of point-to-point 
circuits (e.g., T1), or the link layer for ATM and Ethernet circuits. Increasingly, there is 
an emphasis on encryption technologies which operate at the IP layer. As DoD moves 
toward IPv6, these devices will need to be upgraded to support the new protocol. In the 
interim, tunneling architectures will have to be developed to support the use of IPv4 
encryptors across IPv6 networks and vice-versa. The IPv4 encryptors may require 
software updates to implement tunneling.  
K. IPV6 STANDARDS AND PRODUCT EVOLUTION 
The IPv6 commercial base is well supported, proven interoperable, size deployed 
in the latest generation of routers and operating systems, and is being extended to 
applications and network management and security infrastructure. The initial goal for 
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IPv6 deployment in the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) is to deploy and test the 
base protocols in a series of pilot exercises.  
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Joint Interoperability Test 
Command (JITC) has developed the Department of Defense Internet Protocol Version 6 
Generic Test Plan Version 2 dated September 2006, which describes the test and 
certification process for Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) components.  All products 
certified by this process are placed on an Approved Products List (APL) as IPv6 capable.  
The DoD IPv6 Approved Products List (APL) Process (see figure 2) can be found at the 
APL website: http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/adv_ip/register/register.html.   The current OSD 
mandate is that all DoD PMs purchase from the JITC APL first.  If a candidate product is 
not on APL, the product can be nominated for APL testing and certification.  
Requirements derived from the DISR IPv6 for Capable Product Profile and can be found 
at https://www.aiptl.nit.disa.mil/documents.   The above mandate makes it critical for 
PMs to constantly monitor the APL in order to determine the progress with IPv6 
standards and ensure the COTS products that are being integrated are certified and on the 
APL. By doing this, the PM can reduce overall integration and test risk by utilizing 




Figure 2.   APL Process 
 
 
L. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION ISSUES 
Protocols and products, critical to the IPv6 transition for the DoD, are still under 
development. IPv6 capable commercial products, that meet DoD’s performance, 
interoperability, and IA requirements, continues to be key to the transition. Pacing items 
for T&E and subsequent implementation of IPv6 across the DoD include High Assurance 
Internet Protocol Encryption (HAIPE) devices, network management systems, firewall 
appliances, intrusion detection/prevention systems, PKI implementation, and key 
distribution systems. T&E and operational deployment of IPv6 capabilities may be 
delayed until the critical equipment and devices are commercially available. (The Fiscal 
Year 2006 Department of Defense Internet Protocol Version 6 Test and Evaluation 
Report dated September 2006) 
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Since IPv4 and IPv6 devices are expected to co-exist for some time, thorough 
testing of interoperability, security, and performance is critical for a smooth transition to 
IPv6. Several issues need to be resolved before IPv6 is implemented in DoD networks. 
Areas requiring further emphasis are:  
• Commercial development and T&E is required for IPSec and security 
devices such as firewalls, IDS, HAIPE, and other network security 
appliances. (Criterion 1)  
• T&E is required to adequately demonstrate network and application 
interoperability in mixed IPv4 and IPv6 environments. (Criterion 2)  
• Development and T&E is required for ASIC-based IPv6 routers and Layer 
3 switches to adequately demonstrate IPv6 performance equivalent to, or 
better than, IPv4.  
• (Criterion 3)  
• Development and T&E of integrated IPv6 voice, data, and video products 
is required. The DoD must also agree on technical guidelines for 
integration of voice, data, and video. (Criterion 4)  
• Development of ROHC and T&E for use within tactical environments is 
required. (Criterion 5)  
• Development of data for network models and simulations, combined with 
T&E, is required to adequately demonstrate scalability. (Criterion 6)  
• Development, implementation, and T&E of IPv6 mobility standards and 
features are required for mobile environments. (Criterion 7)  
• Development and implementation of DSTM and application transition 
techniques are required. (Criterion 8)  
• Development and T&E of IPv6 capable network management tools and 
systems are required. (Criterion 9)  
• Development, vendor implementation, and T&E of MIPv6, NEMO, and 
MANET are required. (Criterion 10)  
(The Fiscal Year 2006 Department of Defense Internet Protocol Version 6 Test 
and Evaluation Report dated September 2006) 
M. RECOMMENDED DOD TRANSITION MECHANISMS AND 
STRATEGIES REGARDING IPV6 
Due to the fact that the transition has been planned on an incremental basis there 
will be a significant period where IPv4 and IPv6 traffic must coexist.  Legacy systems 
will likely be operational longer then anticipated because objective systems currently in 
development are often delayed.  In most circumstances the legacy system will be utilized 
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in the field far longer then the projected five year time frame. PMs must incorporate 
acquisition strategies so systems can operate and support IPv4/IPv6 interoperability 
throughout the systems lifecycle.  Also, PMs must follow all applicable guidance 
authorities including DoD level and Army level. 
N. TRANSITION TRADE ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS 
The purpose of the IPv6 trade analysis is to assess transition scenarios and 
provide recommendations based upon each system’s capability, logistics and schedule.  
Technology maturity of transition mechanisms and maturity of IP devices on each system 
should be considered.   The key parameters of the trade space are when the system 
transitions during its lifecycle and to what the system transitions.  
1.   Pre-Deployment Transition 
For pre-deployment transition, the baseline design must be changed from an IPv4-
capable to an IPv4/IPv6-capable system during the design phase.  The focus of the pre-
deployment transition analysis should center on the ramifications of transition mechanism 
technology and network architecture options including dual stacks, tunneling, and 
translation.  
2.  Dual Stack 
The preferred method for DoD and commercial Internet networks is to deploy 
dual stack systems.  The benefit of dual stack is network design simplicity, but it requires 
extra software, memory and processing power within every device.  IPv6 is less 
bandwidth efficient than IPv4 due to larger header size and optional header extensions.  
Futhermore, there are IPv6 options specifying “jumbograms” (extra large packets for 
high speed bandwidth efficiency) that are not feasible over tactical links.  Additionally, 
the optimum size for Minimum Transmission Unit (MTU), fragmented packets, must be 
determined by detailed analysis and testing.   
The fact that tactical networks are inherently low-bandwidth further complicates 
implementation.  Given these complexities, IPv4 may continue to be used for several 
years on low-speed links where the bandwidth inefficiencies would result in an 
unacceptable impact on performance. Additionally, most tactical systems will probably 
need to migrate to an IPv6 only network all at once, due to the fact that the transition 
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mechanisms within IPv4/IPv6 networks are far to bandwidth inefficient to operate over 
lower echelon networks.  In future, JTRS may provide sufficient bandwidth to support a 
transition to IPv6 on lower echelon networks, however from a programmatic perspective, 
lower echelon systems are fairly homogeneous and tend to be fielded in blocks.  
Accelerating replacement schedules once JTRS is available would be technically feasible, 
but will require major increases in program funding due to the significant numbers of end 
systems that would have to be procured.   
3.  Tunneling 
Some of the major issues for IPv6 tunnels are that some require manual 
configuration.  Various proprietary implementations schemes exist, but they tend to 
embed the details of IPv4 routing creating routing inefficiencies, which leads to IPv4 
fragmentations causing extra network traffic.  Since it uses IPv4 routing not improved 
IPv6 routing, it cannot traverse IPv4 NAT and must be deployed with a tunnel broker 
service to automate setup and take down.  Tunnel brokers may cause 20 or more packets 
to establish a tunnel. Configured tunnels may not be effective in tactical networks due to 
manual intervention, performance, and security.  
The IPv6 header is twice the size of the IPv4 header. Optional IPv6 header 
extensions would also increase header length. If in addition, IPv6 packets (from 
applications) are tunneled through IPv4, we can expect that network performance will be 
degraded over bandwidth constrained links, and links with long latencies, such as 
SATCOM. High Bit Error Rates (BER) exacerbates the problem, since packets that are 
lost must be retransmitted, increasing packet reassembly delay. This would be especially 
true for small packets (e.g., VoIP) caught behind larger packets in the router’s queue.  
4.   Translation 
Each translation mechanism has its own advantages and disadvantages with 
respect to performance, security, operational efficiency, and scalability.  However, each 
method requires either extra software within a host or an external device to provide this 
capability. Translation has high system overhead, limited manageability, is focused on a 
single host or single communications path, may have security limitations, and is a high-
cost alternative.  Therefore, translation may not represent a viable alternative.   
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O. RECOMMENDED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION MECHANISMS 
Dual stack is the preferred mechanism because of its scalability and minimal 
impact on performance.  It also meets current tactical network criteria for configuration, 
manageability, reliability, scalability and security.  Dual stack has the additional benefit 
of requiring less bandwidth since it requires minimal connection setup. 
When some portions of the tactical network do not support both IPv4 and IPv6, 
tunneling or translation may be required.   The preferred method in this instance would be 
tunneling due to the fact that translation requires either extra software within a host or an 
external device driving implementation cost.  The extra burden on bandwidth and long 
latencies must be considered when implementing tunneling transition mechanisms. 
P. POST-DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION 
The DoD will implement transition with Technology Refresh whenever feasible.  
PMs should therefore plan for transition using Technology Refresh or Software Block 
upgrade programs.  The assumption the Army will obtain IPV6 Upgrade through FCS, 
WIN-T, and JTRS entails total replacement of existing systems.  This has some issues, 
may not be supportable in reality and is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.  The 
current force systems will be in the field for the foreseeable future. Current Force and 
Future Force systems will have to be interoperable.  Furthermore, given the fact that 
tactical networks are inherently low-bandwidth and IPv6 requires more overhead may 
dictate field systems remain IPv4 only for the foreseeable future.  The one major issue 
with this approach is adequate IPv4 address space to accommodate the dual stack 
environment. 
Given the fact that many tactical systems will remain IPv4-only for a long time 
the implementation of a dual stack core and gradual implementation of dual stack 
IPv4/IPv6 devices and applications is the recommended approach.  These devices and 
applications would attempt to “favor” IPv6, but have the ability to fall back on IPv4 as a 
secondary method.  Traffic would be carried end-to-end as either IPv6 or IPv4 whenever 
practical.  This approach could potentially avoid the use of many transition mechanisms, 
which themselves introduce a great deal of complexity.  Additionally, many of the IPv6 
transition mechanisms introduce single points of failure which could be avoided by this 
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approach.  A transition to an IPv6-only core could occur at a later time, when a sufficient 






















V.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ALLOCATION OF ADDRESS SPACE? 
The Internet has provided the DoD the ability to exploit new theories that enable 
Net-centric warfare to become a reality.  Net-centric warfare requires a culture change in 
relationships that will allow information sharing between various groups of people and 
organizations.  The capabilities that Net-centric warfare introduces are on the cutting 
edge of technology and will enable commanders to dominate conflicts with greater 
precision.  Commanders today have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and 
coordinates, which are transmitted by e-mail to aircraft in flight.  Previously, 
commanders relied on maps, grease pencils, and radio reports to plan their strikes. The 
advances in technology that make modern day warfare possible require additional IP 
address space resources. Management of transitioning to networks capable of supporting 
these advances will therefore be a significant challenge for the foreseeable future.  
B. ADDRESSING PLAN FOR THE DOD 
It is clear the DoD must function in a dual IPv4/IPv6 capacity when implementing 
IPv6.  Operating in this capacity is essential to maintaining the relevance of currently 
fielded programs.  Having the ability to operate in a dual capacity will facilitate the 
transition to IPv6 because systems will not be precluded from operation on a specified 
date.  Setting an estimated transition date as a goal is imperative to success.  However, if 
the DoD had directed a specific transition date, programs without adequate resources 
would be facing losses in operational service.  This means a phased transition approach is 
needed to ensure the continued operation of currently used IPv4 systems in the field.  
The DoD should use a decision making process that incorporates various 
stakeholders at all levels of operation.  Everyone from the individual soldier to the 
general officers should be communicating their concerns and opinions for this transition.  
This open communication and dialogue enables problems to be identified before policy is 
directed and implemented.  It is apparent that the DoD took into account many aspects 
when considering a phased transition.   
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The DoD should first convert core networks to IPv6 and then convert the access 
level networks and application hosts to IPv6.  This will ensure the network will already 
be compliant when individual programs become compliant.  This also enables the IPv4 
applications to operate on the IPv6 core without complication. When all applications are 
running on the IPv6 core, the IPv4 traffic will discontinue.   
C. NETWORKS 
Networks with several security levels create many challenges in securing 
information in a Net-centric environment.  Having networks separate will ensure 
information of different security levels are kept separate and free from intrusion.  Failure 
to adhere to this philosophy will endanger the security and integrity of sensitive 
information during transition.     
D. DOD NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER IPV6 ADDRESS 
MANAGEMENT 
Having the right information at the right time is imperative to the decision making 
process.  Limiting the information flow by not including key stakeholders will hinder 
DoD decision makers ability to set informed policy.  Additional resources will be 
required when information is continually distorted before it reaches DoD leadership.  For 
these reasons, it is recommended the DoD organize in a horizontal structure when 
establishing policy that affects stakeholders at every level within the DoD.     
When allocating address space at the resource allocation level, the MIL NIC and 
Agency NICs should adopt a hierarchical process for submitting address space 
requirements.  This will increase transition efficiency, because agencies applying for 
address space will be required to demonstrate a valid need.  When Agency NICs gather 
enough requests for address space, they can request a single block of space from the MIL 
NIC.  This process will decrease the workload at the MIL NIC, increase efficiency for 
allocating address space, and provide a higher level of confidence that the request for 
address space is validated.  If the MIL NIC and Agency NICs attempted to institute a 
horizontal approach to allocating address space at the resource level internal strife 
between agencies could emerge.  When organizations are competing for address space on 
the same level confusion will emerge and efficiency will decrease.      
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Success in transitioning to IPv6 will require continuing some practices currently 
being used with IPv4.  These practices include allowing the DoD NICs to continue 
maintenance of DNS servers, zone files, and delegate subordinate zones for their 
respective forward DNS zones will ensure this support. 
E. ESTIMATING COST TO TRANSITION POR SYSTEMS FROM IPV4 TO 
IPV6 
Legacy systems should be transitioned using Technology Refresh or Software 
Block upgrade programs. These upgrades must be implemented with careful analysis of 
the effects on tactical network operations.  Systems with sufficient throughput for current 
needs should be transitioned using their normal technology refresh/software upgrade 
schedules.  The estimated cost can be projected using standard software and hardware 
estimating models such as Constructive Cost Model COCOMO for software 
development.  Systems without sufficient throughput to support transition should be 
maintained as IPv4-only systems.  If these systems are not planned for obsolescence 
within the mandated five year window then the waiver process must be followed and 
replacement systems identified for future upgrades to those GIG assets.   
The cost to transition systems in development from IPv4-only to IPv4 and IPv6 
capability will be driven by maturity of the design for the system.   The insertion of 
already approved software and hardware products from the JITC APL can alleviate much 
of the additional cost.   It is recommended that the government work with the affected 
contractors in order to estimate the cost of the transition.  The government must also 
generate an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) in order to gain a full appreciation for the 
additional funding required.  Finally, the government needs to account for additional 
interoperability and certification testing required for the transition. 
The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, Programs must consider all input gathered 
from the PEOs before allocating resources.  When direction is set prior to a complete 
analysis, significant amounts of rework are generally required.  The guidance to use 
technology refresh funding to accomplish a significant portion of the transition resulted in 
the “good enough drill,” decision which eliminated the majority of funding for 
technology refresh of the BFAs.  To further complicate this situation, Joint Command 
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and Control (JC2) is slated to replace Command and Control (C2) and the JC2 Program 
Manager has not provided any programmatic information for transition.  Presently, the 
JC2 BFA has no funding associated with its IPv6 transition requirements.   
F. BENEFIT TO THE DOD OF TRANSITION 
1.   Interoperability  
Having warfighting information systems on a network where intelligence can be 
posted, accessed, and analyzed is the DoD’s concept for being Net-centric.  Net-centricity 
requires not only the ability to share data but also the ability to create it.  Net-centricity 
will enable the soldier to discover access, integrate, correlate, and fuse information and 
data to support their operations.  To fully realize the potential of Net-centric operations, 
people, organizations, process, information, and material must operate synergistically.  
Accordingly, the DoD should address the business-process redesign first and then focus 
on the people, organization, and information needed to implement the new processes.   
When transiting to IPv6, organizations will need to change the way information is shared 
between organizations.  The change will likely amount to adopting an attitude of 
openness, or willingness to share information, rather than a need-to-know attitude, which 
may be possibly the largest cultural challenge for the DoD.    
2.   Improved End-to-End Security  
Maintaining the security of DoD networks from intrusion is a major concern for 
the DoD.  Without guaranteed end-to-end security, information can become vulnerable to 
hackers or other system attacks that seek to pilfer classified or sensitive information.  
IDSs ensure IPv6 networks are protected from intrusion because they block hackers from 
entering networks without required security encryption.  Achieving this goal will require 
more work in the availability and quality of IDSs.   The DoD must follow Japan’s lead in 
IDSs development.  Japan began developing IDSs prior to IPv6 transition.  The United 
States is behind the power curve in developing IDS and must aggressively pursue 
development or networks will lack adequate security controls.   
Properly implementing and continually monitoring IPv6s security features is 
required for safeguarding network information.  SEND devices must be implemented to 
protect users when accessing databases on the network.  SEND will ensure that both 
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points of access on both the sender and receiver end of network traffic is secure.  
Implementing QoS will ensure time critical information is prioritized so it reaches the 
commander in a timely fashion, allowing tactical or strategic advantage.  Mobile IP and 
auto configuration must be utilized in order for soldiers on the move to access 
information.  IPSec will monitor user access and safeguard information that is beyond 
their need to know.  Complete end-to-end IPSec is a necessary aspect of a Net-centric 
architecture because in this environment, various users will have differing security levels.  
Achieving confidence in security will require implementation and monitoring of these 
aspects in addition to continually updating the network as new security devices become 
available.   
3.   Ease System Management Burdens  
Within the next few years wireless devices will be available to every soldier on 
the battlefield.  This increase in wireless devices will demand significant amounts of IP 
address spaces and keeping networks flexible and available will be challenging.  
Networks will need to be scalable to keep management tasks from becoming serious 
burdens that degrade network operations. 
One important aspect of address space management that should be implemented is 
a centralized database for IP addresses.  This will ease management burdens because 
updates can be preformed concurrently.  The centralized database will also allow for 
greater accuracy and consistency, which will lead to less confusion when users are trying 
to access information.  When individual soldiers are equipped with PDAs special 
considerations should apply.  Auto-configuration will be essential for users who are on 
the move because they will require seamless access to other networks within the battle 
space.  Failure to implement auto-configuration would require additional time and 
resources to acquire needed information. These resources may not be available in time 
critical situations.          
G. ISSUES SURROUNDING DOD TRANSITION 
The DoD’s transition has been extended to FY16 in order to minimize transition 
cost by increasing the use of Technology Refresh programs., It is important that planned 
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and programmed systems be acquired with support for both IPv6 and IPv4. This includes 
ensuring that: 
• The requirements for all DoD developed products include both IPv6 and 
IPv4 support. 
• Commercial products selected include both IPv6 and IPv4 support. 
• Coexistence strategies must be developed to ensure interoperability with 
legacy systems until the transition is complete. 
H. MAINTAINING INTEROPERABILITY 
Acquisition cycles and product lifetimes for DoD GIG assets are usually 
substantially longer than commercial technology cycles, particularly for tactical-level 
systems.  The increased bandwidth requirement will make transition impractical for some 
handheld, man packed, and vehicle mounted systems.  The assumption that legacy 
systems will be obsolete in five years or less is inconsistent with the current operational 
and fiscal environments.  The systems currently in development and slated to replace 
legacy system are more often than not, delayed in development due to several factors 
such as technical challenges, funding shortfalls, cost overruns, and schedule delays.  It is 
projected that the legacy system will be required in the field far longer than the projected 
five year time frame. 
The assumption that the Army will obtain IPV6 Upgrade through FCS, WIN-T, 
and JTRS assumes total replacement of existing systems.  This is unlikely to happen on 
known schedules.  At least some legacy systems will be in the field for the foreseeable 
future.  Current Force and Future Force systems must therefore be interoperable.  All new 
systems fielded will be required to support both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. It is 
recommended that DoD development systems be implemented in a fashion to facilitate 
easy changes to the IP protocol as it matures (i.e., a strongly layered architecture that 
separates the network/IP layer).  It is critical that the implementation facilitate changing 
the protocol. 
I. SECURITY ISSUES 
Many of the security threats to today’s IPv4 networks will not disappear with the 
deployment of IPv6. This includes vulnerabilities present in higher level protocols and 
services within the network. There is an increasing emphasis on encryption technologies 
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which operate at the IP layer. As the DoD moves toward IPv6, these devices will need to 
be upgraded to support the new protocol.  In the interim, tunneling architectures will have 
to be developed to support the use of IPv4 encryptors across IPv6 networks and vice-
versa. The IPv4 encryptors may require software updates to implement tunneling.  
J. IPV6 STANDARDS AND PRODUCT EVOLUTION 
The current mandate by OSD is that all DoD PMs purchase from the JITC APL 
first.  If a candidate product is not on APL, the product can be nominated for APL testing 
and certification. It is critical that PMs constantly monitor the APL in order to determine 
the progress with IPv6 standards and ensure the COTS products that are being integrated 
in their systems are certified and on the APL.   
K. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION ISSUES 
The DoD must generate an integrated T&E strategy to address the performance 
and scalability of IPv6 in networks.  All IPv6 capabilities including, interoperability, 
transition techniques, and security solutions must be tested on these networks at the DoD 
level. This integrated T&E is needed to ensure that performance in secure environments 
using these IPv6 solutions still meets the user’s operational requirements. Since IPv4 and 
IPv6 devices are expected to coexist for some time, thorough testing of interoperability, 
security, and performance is also critical for a smooth transition to IPv6.   
L. RECOMMENDED DOD TRANSITION MECHANISMS AND 
STRATEGIES REGARDING IPV6 
Given that legacy systems will be operational longer then advertised and because 
objective systems currently in development are often delayed, legacy systems will be 
utilized far longer then the projected five year time frame.  PMs must accordingly 
incorporate acquisition strategies systems support IPv4/IPv6 interoperability throughout 
the system’s lifecycle.   
M. TRANSITION TRADE ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS 
The PM should conduct transition trade analysis in order to assess transition 
scenarios and provide the best transition recommendations based upon each system’s 




devices on each system must be considered.  The key parameters of the trade space seem 
to involve when the system transitions during its lifecycle and to what the system 
transitions.   
N. PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION 
For systems in development, the baseline design must be changed from an IPv4-
capable to an IPv4/IPv6-capable system during the design phase.  The focus of the pre-
deployment transition analysis should center on the hardware ramifications and network 
architecture options including dual stacks, tunneling, and translation.  
1.   Dual Stack 
The preferred method for DoD and commercial Internet networks is to deploy 
dual stack systems.  The benefit of dual stack is design simplicity, but it requires extra 
software, memory and processing power within every device.  Native IPv6 is less 
bandwidth efficient than IPv4 due to additional header size and optional header 
extensions.  Additionally, the optimum size for Minimum Transmission Unit (MTU), 
fragmented packets, must be determined by detailed analysis and testing.   
2.   Tunneling 
Some of the major issues for IPv6 tunnels IPv6 are that some require manual 
configuration. Since it uses IPv4 routing (not improved IPv6 routing), it cannot traverse 
IPv4 NATs (i.e. network address translation devices), and must be deployed with a tunnel 
broker service to automate setup and take down, and it may cause 20 or more packets to 
establish a tunnel (not useful for short data transfers). Configured tunnels may not be 
effective in tactical networks due to manual intervention, performance, and security.  For 
this reason it is recommended that dual stack transition be implemented whenever 
technically feasible. 
3.   Translation 
Each translation mechanism has its own advantages and disadvantages with 
respect to performance, security, operational efficiency, and scalability.  However, each 
method requires either extra software within a host or an external device to provide this 
capability. Translation has high system overhead, limited manageability, is focused on a 
single host or single communications path, may have security limitations, and is a high- 
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cost alternative.  Therefore, translation may not represent a viable alternative and should 
only be used as a last resort when both dual stack and tunneling are not technically 
feasible.  
O. RECOMMENDED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION MECHANISMS 
Dual stack is the preferred mechanism because of its scalability and minimal 
impact on performance.  It also meets current tactical network criteria for configuration, 
manageability, reliability, scalability and security.  Dual stack has the additional benefit 
of requiring less bandwidth since it requires minimal connection setup. 
When some portions of the tactical network do not support both IPv4 and IPv6, 
tunneling or translation may be required.   The preferred method in this instance would be 
tunneling since translation requires either extra software within a host or an external 
device driving implementation cost.  The extra burden on bandwidth and long latencies 
must be considered when implementing tunneling transition mechanisms. 
P. POST-DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION 
PMs should plan for transition using Technology Refresh or Software Block 
upgrade programs.  The current force systems will be in the field for the foreseeable 
future. Current Force and Future Force systems will have to be interoperable.  The one 
major issue with this approach is adequate IPv4 address space to accommodate the Dual 
stack IPv4/IPv6 environment. 
Numerous tactical systems will remain IPv4 capable into the foreseeable future.  
Implementing a dual stack core and gradually execution of dual stack IPv4/IPv6 devices 
is the recommended approach.  These devices and applications would attempt to “favor” 
IPv6 but have the ability to fall back on IPv4 as a secondary method.  Traffic would be 
carried end-to-end as either IPv6 or IPv4 whenever practical.  This approach could 
potentially avoid the use of many transition mechanisms, which themselves introduce a 
great deal of complexity.  Additionally, many of the IPv6 transition mechanisms 
introduce single points of failure which could be avoided by this approach.  A transition 
to an IPv6 only core could occur later, when a sufficient amount of IPv6 applications are 
generating a significant amount of IPv6 traffic.   
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Q. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The critical areas PMs must address to ensure a smooth transition to IPv6: 
• DoD GIG assets must function in a dual IPv4/IPv6 capacity when 
implementing transition to IPv6 in order to maintain the relevance of 
currently fielded programs. 
• Maintaining separate networks for different security levels will ensure 
information security and keep networks free from intrusion.    
• The DoD should organize in a horizontal structure when establishing 
policy that affects stakeholders at every level within the DoD.     
• Legacy GIG assets should be transitioned using Technology Refresh or 
Software Block upgrade programs. Upgrades must be implemented with 
careful analysis and testing in order to determine the effects on tactical 
network operations and the performance of these assets. 
• GIG assets in development must transition from IPv4-only to IPv4 and 
IPv6 capability.  
• The OSD mandate is that all DoD PMs purchase from the JITC APL first.  
If a candidate product is not on APL, the product can be nominated for 
APL testing and certification. 
• Since IPv4 and IPv6 devices are expected to co-exist for some time, 
thorough testing of interoperability, security, and performance is critical 
for a smooth transition to IPv6.   
• PMs should conduct transition trade analysis in order provide the best 
transition approach based upon each GIG asset’s capability, logistics and 
schedule. 
• Pre-Deployment transitions should utilize the Dual stack transition 
mechanism due to its scalability and minimal impact on performance. 
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